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Preface 
In March and April 1983, the Center for East Asian Studies of 
the University of Kansas sponsored a "Colloquium on U.S.-China 
Economic and Trade Relations/ ' This was made possible in large 
part through a National Resource Center grant from the United 
States Department of Education. 
Six distinguished scholars presented public lectures in the 
course of the colloquium. Since their topics complemented each 
other very well, and since each presentation was timely and rich 
in insights, the Center for East Asian Studies has proceeded to 
publish the essays from which the public lectures were given. In 
the interests of rapid dissemination of these analyses of contem-
porary issues, I have not recast the essays into a common mold. 
They are presented here much as each author wrote them. Two of 
the essays have sources appended, the others do not. Interested 
readers will find these sources useful in pursuing further some of 
the topics covered by Dr. Clarke and Professor Marer. Likewise, 
the six statistical tables at the end of Dr. Clarke's essay provide a 
useful reference for points made by all of the authors. 
Taken together, I believe that these essays provide both an 
excellent overview and a series of informed in-depth studies of 
U.S.-China trade relations and the economic realities which 
underlie them. Each has the virtue of providing some historical 
perspective as well as a description of the present scene. And 
each is balanced—none of the authors has an axe to grind on his 
particular subject. In the course of the volume, the major eco-
nomic sectors where U.S. business has the greatest interest and 
potential in China relations are discussed—agriculture, energy, 
technology transfer, and investment capital. Yet the overriding 
importance of political relations is also kept in mind by all of the 
authors, and is particularly stressed by Professor Lamp ton in his 
concluding essay. Altogether, the essays elucidate a sound basis 
for optimism, as well as some valid causes for concern, regarding 
the future of U.S.-China economic and trade relations. 
I wish to thank all six authors for their public presentations 
and for their cooperation in providing me the written essays with 
which to work. Thanks are also due to John Garland, and 
v 
especially to Marie Adams, for their assistance. Special thanks are 
due the China Council of the Asia Society for permission to use 
the material in Thomas Fingar's essay, which was originally 
written for the China Council. The content of these essays, of 
course, is the responsibility of each author, and does not neces-
sarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Education or 
the Center for East Asian Studies. 
July, 1983 Daniel H. Bays 
Center for East Asian Studies 
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THE US-CHINA ECONOMIC 
RELATIONSHIP: ENTERING THE 
SECOND DECADE 
Christopher M. Clarke 
Introduction* 
The economic relationship between the United States and the 
People's Republic of China is still in its infancy. After the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean 
War, the US and China entered a period of hostility and mutual 
distrust which has only begun to change since Richard Nixon's 
historic visit to Beijing in 1972. As in any relatively new relation-
ship, and particularly one between great and proud countries, 
problems are inevitable. China and the United States have differ-
ent national interests, different economic, social and political 
systems, and different domestic political pressures. Nevertheless, 
remarkable progress has been made in "normalizing" the eco-
nomic component of the relationship during the last decade. This 
has not been an easy process, and painful steps lie ahead in 
pursuing its accomplishment. 
This article briefly examines the role of foreign trade in the 
People's Republic of China, the policies on which it is based, and 
the historic magnitude, composition and direction of China's 
international economic activity. The article will concentrate on 
the Sino-American economic relationship since 1972, including 
the changing composition of US-China trade and problems en-
countered in expanding Sino-American intercourse. Finally, it 
will turn to the prospects for this relationship as the second 
decade of US-China trade begins. 
* This article represents solely the opinions of the author. It does not necessarily 
represent the opinions of the National Council for US-China Trade. 
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RECENT PATTERNS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE 
The role of foreign trade in China 
The size of her territory, population, resources and domestic 
market would make it natural for foreign trade to be a relatively 
small component of China's overall economic activity.1 This 
tendency has been reinforced since 1949 by two other factors. 
First is the residual role foreign trade plays in most centrally 
planned, non-market economies. Second is China's international 
conservatism growing out of both the communist and the Chinese 
heritage of the PRC's leaders. 
The Chinese since 1949 have relegated foreign trade to a 
supplementary role in economic activity. As China's minister of 
foreign trade said in 1955, "Exports are for imports, and imports 
are for the country's industrialization."2 
Despite its supplementary nature, China's foreign trade has 
been and remains an important element in her modernization 
plans and a vital link to the international economic system. In 
absolute terms, China's foreign trade has grown in an almost 
uninterrupted fashion every year since 1950. The two major 
exceptions, the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward (1960-1963) 
and the height of the Cultural Revolution (1967-1969), saw only a 
temporary disruption of this pattern. (Table 1) 
By contrast, China's major trading partners and the composi-
tion of China's foreign trade have changed substantially over the 
last 30 years. Between 1952 and 1955, other communist countries 
accounted for about four-fifths of China's imports and more than 
two-thirds of her exports.3 After falling out with the USSR, this 
pattern changed. By 1962, non-communist partners totalled more 
than half of China's imports and 40% of her exports. The most 
striking example of this directional change is a comparison of US-
China trade with Sino-Soviet trade in the period 1950-80. (Table 
1) 
China's import and export composition also changed during 
her first three decades. Under the First Five Year Plan (1953-7), 
China imported massive amounts of machinery, equipment and 
whole plant ("means of production").4 From 1953-60, these 
items accounted for more than 90% of China's imports. During 
the "three bad years" following the Great Leap, however, China 
was forced to import large quantities of food grain. Subsequently, 
"means of subsistence" occupied at least 15% of China's imports 
in all but one year, and in excess of 20% in 13 of the next 20 years. 
(Table 1) In recent years, as China has again looked abroad for 
assistance in modernizing her economy, manufactured goods and 
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machinery have accounted for 50-68% of Chinese imports (Table 
2), but imports of foodstuffs remain substantial. 
By contrast, between 1954 and 1974 less than one-third of 
China's exports consisted of industrial and mineral products 
(Table 1). This percentage now exceeds half. In 1981, manufac-
tured goods and machinery alone made up more than 44% of 
China's exports. (Table 2) 
When the dust of the Cultural Revolution cleared in the 1970s, 
Chinese economic leaders, and indeed the man on the street, 
began to see the damage that had been done to the economy. They 
began to realize that the world had passed them by, that their 
technology was not sufficiently advanced to raise the living 
standard of the people, provide for the national defense and 
develop a thriving, self-sustaining economy. They somewhat 
reluctantly accepted the necessity of importing Western ma-
chinery, technology and modern management science. 
The realization that China's economic development is closely 
tied to the international economic system has been a painful 
process for China. In the early 1970's, politically powerful 
elements of the leadership opposed enmeshing China in a system 
over which she would have little control.5 When the first phase of 
this involvement in 1973-4 created unpleasant economic side 
effects for China, leaders associated with the policy (including 
Zhou Enlai and especially Deng Xiaoping) came under attack. 
After the death of Mao, China began a second phase of massive 
involvement in the international economy. Within a year, how-
ever, unpleasant side effects were again causing a reappraisal; 
leading officials were calling for a period of "summing up 
experiences."6 
That the Chinese leadership remains sensitive to the appeal of 
Mao's slogan of "maintaining independence, keeping the initia-
tive in our own hands and relying on our own efforts" is clear. 
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang reaffirmed such 
a position in his address to the Twelfth Party Congress in 
September 1982: 
In our efforts for socialist modernization, we must take a 
self reliant stand, relying mainly on our own hard work . . . 
In no circumstances must we forget that capitalist countries 
and enterprises will never change their capitalist nature 
simply because they have economic and technological 
exchanges with us.7 
In the same vein, Premier Zhao Ziyang reported to the Fifth 
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in December 1982 
that "the aim of expanding our foreign economic and technologi-
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cal exchanges is of course to raise our capacity for self-reliance, 
and definitely not to weaken or impair the development of our 
national economy. Under no circumstances will we waver on this 
point."8 
The tension between the needs of modernization and the deep-
rooted desire for independence has expressed itself in the dual 
policy slogans which now govern China's foreign economic 
relations: "self reliance with an open door" and "equality and 
mutual benefit."9 
The Open Door 
Beginning in 1978, China opened her doors wider and wider 
to foreign involvement in her economy.10 China's total foreign 
trade almost tripled between 1977 and 1981, as did both imports 
and exports. However, under the twin hammers of international 
recession and domestic economic readjustment, China's foreign 
trade suffered a setback in 1982. Exports increased only slightly 
while imports were cut back by about one-fifth. The Sixth Five 
Year Plan, promulgated in December, 1982, however, envisions a 
major effort to expand both exports and imports. 
One of the ten specific tasks enumerated in the Plan is "to 
vigorously expand foreign trade, effectively utilize foreign capital 
and actively import advanced technical know-how in order to 
promote economic and technical development in the country."11 
To this end the Chinese forsee growth of overall foreign trade 
between 1980 and 1985 averaging 8.7% per year. Imports will 
actually grow more rapidly than exports, resulting in a trade 
deficit for the period of some $2.5 billion.12 In 1983 alone the 
trade deficit is expected to rise to some $1.9 billion.13 
Foreign involvement in the Chinese economy, however, has 
far transcended simple buying and selling. With the July 1979 
promulgation of the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and 
Foreign Investment, China began encouraging foreign investors 
to establish jointly managed enterprises on Chinese soil. Since 
then more that $2.9 billion in foreign investment has been 
committed to nearly 13,000 Chinese enterprises.14 Four Special 
Economic Zones15 and several other incentive areas have been set 
up to attract foreign investment. Further, the Chinese government 
has sought and obtained substantial international technical and 
professional aid in identifying investment projects and analyzing 
their feasibility. In June 1982, the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) cosponsored with the Chi-
nese a forum in which 130 such projects were discussed and 
offered up for foreign investment.16 Since 1980, the World Bank 
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has also been engaged in a long-term effort to identify promising 
projects under both its soft-term International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA) and hard loan International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) programs.17 
Perhaps the most publicised Chinese-foreign cooperation has 
been in the development of China's offshore oil. This will 
ultimately involve unprecedented reliance on foreign companies 
for technical assistance, capital and equipment in some of the 
most sensitive economic, geographic and political areas of 
China.18 In addition, foreign engineering, technology and equip-
ment will be major components in the development of other high 
priority sectors like hydropower, coal, port and railway construc-
tion and light industry.19 
A final indication of the extent of foreign penetration into 
China's economy is the proliferation of laws and regulations in 
the economic realm in the last three years. At least 35 major 
pieces of legislation have been published ranging from laws on 
joint venture investment to income taxes, control of resident 
offices of foreign enterprises in China, foreign exchange control, 
functioning of enterprises in special economic zones, exploitation 
of offshore oil, advertising, economic contracts, civil procedure 
and marine environmental protection. Some of these have been 
modelled on foreign experience; some have even made use of the 
advice of foreign legal experts as consultants. Under strong 
foreign pressure, China is now putting the finishing touches on a 
patent law and is working on copyright legislation. 
Self Reliance 
All of this foreign penetration of the Chinese economy and 
society has made the leadership nervous. Over the past several 
years numerous cases of embezzlement, bribery, graft and other 
forms of corruption have come to light. Smuggling, especially 
through Guangdong and Fujian provinces, has become a particu-
larly sensitive and troublesome problem as Chinese citizens with 
extra cash have been willing to risk purchasing foreign luxury 
consumer goods on the black market rather than buy Chinese 
products which are often unavailable, of low quality, or require 
time-consuming requests and delays. Some officials have even 
turned to illegal channels to bypass the cumbersome bureaucracy 
in obtaining needed equipment and supplies. Such "profiteering 
and speculation" is apparently widespread.20 
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang echoed his 
colleagues' concern about the corrupting influence of foreign 
involvement in China when he told the Twelfth Party Congress: 
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"While pursuing the policy of opening to the outside, we must 
guard against, and firmly resist, the corrosion of capitalist ideas 
and we must combat any worship of foreign things or fawning on 
foreigners."21 
Top Party leader and economic planner Chen Yun has called 
the disintegration of Party spirit a "matter of life and death." As 
head of the CCP's Discipline Inspection Commission he has 
overseen a massive campaign to root out and eliminate corrup-
tion.22 Two Guangdong officials guilty of embezzlement and 
smuggling have been executed23 and numerous others fired, 
demoted, sent to prison or otherwise disciplined. 
Aside from the social disintegration blamed on foreign influ-
ence, Chinese leaders are wary of the economic impact of im-
ported goods and machinery. Remembering China's experience 
in the century before Liberation,24 they are particularly concerned 
that imports not stunt the growth of Chinese industry. Especially 
sensitive are the machinery industry and consumer goods. 
In April 1982 a People's Daily editorial singled out the 
automotive vehicle industry as well as seamless steel pipe, 
mining equipment and other sectors as suffering from the effects 
of "blind imports ."2 5 Shanghai officials pointed out that during 
the first 10 months of 1981 China imported 16,000 automobiles, 
the cost of which was four times the total State investment in the 
Shanghai motor-vehicle plant.26 
Consumer goods, particularly consumer durables and elec-
tronics, have also been the target of a "buy Chinese" campaign.27 
As a result of these pressures, the Chinese government announced 
a new policy in January 1981. 
In principle, the following machinery and equipment 
should not be imported from abroad: equipment that can be 
produced domestically; equipment that China can man-
ufacture and that requires only foreign technology; equip-
ment that can be made or assembled in China through 
importing a few key components or materials; and equip-
ment that can be manufactured cooperatively with foreign 
firms through the introduction of expertise or technical 
cooperation.28 
In addition, emphasis will now be placed on domestic sourcing of 
as much equipment as possible when importing a "whole plant" 
project or cooperating in offshore oil development29, and the 
Chinese are embarking on a major drive to boost exports of their 
own machinery and equipment.30 
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Equality and Mutual Benefit 
In addition to "self reliance with an open door/' China's 
foreign trade rests on a fundamental policy of "equality and 
mutual benefit." The Chinese realize that for foreign investment 
and trade to yield the benefits for China that the leadership 
desires, they must provide a stable environment and one in which 
the foreigner can make and repatriate a reasonable profit. Unfortu-
nately this attitude is not yet universal among Chinese officials. 
One foreign businessman was told in all seriousness that foreign 
investors should be happy because China provides them with a 
secure place to invest their surplus, capital. 
This points up the sensitive political problem for Chinese 
leaders of providing sufficient incentive to foreign investors 
without creating domestic political charges of destroying China's 
socialist economy, selling out her natural heritage or permitting 
exploitation of a proletarian China by capitalist imperialists. 
China's leaders are caught in another policy delimma. They 
espouse the principle of equality but it is not easy to say what 
China is equal to. In aggregate economic and geopolitical terms 
China is a superpower.31 In per capital terms, however, China is a 
less developed country.32 
Moreover, China's international posture is that "Socialist 
China belongs to the Third World . . . China regards it as her 
sacred international duty to struggle resolutely against imperial-
ism, hegemonism and colonialism."33 China's position as a third 
world country allows her to expect subsidized international aid 
and special treatment by the major economic powers. For exam-
ple, China expects wealthier countries to provide better contract 
terms, lower interest rates, free services (e.g. feasibility studies) 
and preferential trade agreements. At the same time, China's 
position as a major political actor makes her sensitive to the 
controls normally attached to such assistance. Moreover, the 
Chinese government is not reluctant to take advantage of her own 
assets such as the lure of oil and her right to access to soft-term 
international loans. 
This ambivalence about the meaning of equality leads to some 
frustrating incongruities in the interface between China and other 
countries. One such incongruity is the meaning of reciprocity. To 
Americans, reciprocity implies that U.S. citizens in China have 
the same privileges enjoyed by Chinese in the U.S. But, in the 
words of a prominent American China Scholar, 
To the Chinese, reciprocity is achieved when they treat 
Americans in China as they handle other foreigners and 
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when the Chinese are accorded the same privileges in the 
United States as those obtained by other aliens from non-
hostile countries.34 
This different interpretation of reciprocity has caused endless 
complaints among foreign businessmen and journalists in 
China.35 
Fiscal Conservatism 
The final principle on which Chinese foreign trade is based is 
not generally officially discussed. China's experience with post 
World War II inflation and with repaying the Soviet debt in the 
1960's have reinforced China's fiscal conservatism in the interna-
tional market. Ever since paying off the Soviets, China has 
attempted to diversify her sources of supply for crucial imports 
and to balance her foreign trade on a yearly basis and with each 
trading partner. 
As a result of the *'great leap to the West" in 1978-80, 
however, China sustained relatively large yearly foreign trade 
deficits for three years in a row. This led to the reassessment of 
trade policy; imports and exports were basically balanced in 1981 
and imports were dramatically cut in 1982. 
Mainly as a result of this readjustment, China's balance of 
payments position (including all transactions, not just trade) in 
1981-2 was very strong. In 1981 China had a current account 
surplus of $3.5 billion which expanded to an estimated $5 billion 
by 1982.36 
Despite this strong position, and despite the strong recommen-
dation of the World Bank and other financial institutions that 
China borrow more, the PRC's international debt obligations are 
quite small. By the end of 1981 China had an international credit 
line of more than $30 billion but had borrowed only about one-
sixth of that amount.37 By contrast, her hard currency reserves 
exceeded $5 billion, more than her outstanding debt.38 
US-CHINA TRADE, 1972-83 
The First Decade 
Beginning in 1969, the US government relaxed restrictions on 
trade and intercourse between American citizens and the PRC.39 
Trade began in 1971 at the very modest level of $4.9 million, 
(Table 3) but expanded dramatically following the signing of the 
Shanghai Communique in 1972. The opening of liaison offices by 
China (in Washington) and the US (in Beijing), and the establish-
ment of the National Council for US-China Trade in 1973, 
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contributed materially to the rapid growth of Sino-American trade 
in 1973-4. 
US-China trade dropped off sharply in 1975 as a result of a 
combination of factors. First, as one expert account has put it, 
"China's trade strategy unravelled in 1974."4 0 This strategy was 
predicated on the export of large quantities of Chinese petroleum 
to pay for large-scale imports of machinery and whole plant. The 
Arab oil embargo, however, created both recession and inflation 
in the West which led to higher prices for China's imports and 
reduced demand abroad for Chinese products. China conse-
quently faced a $1.2 billion trade deficit with non-Communist 
countries in 1974 forcing Chinese leaders to cut back on pur-
chases of both agricultural commodities and machinery. Sec-
ondly, domestic economic difficulties and embarrassment over 
miscalculating the international economic environment brought 
leftist internal political pressure on China's leaders. This reached 
crisis proportions after the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 
when the leadership was accused of having "sold out its national 
heritage" and of shifting the international energy crisis onto the 
backs of the Chinese.41 
Thirdly, China enjoyed good harvests of grain in 1974-5 and of 
cotton in 1973-4. This, combined with some Chinese dissatisfac-
tion with US political instability in the wake of Watergate and 
with the consequent slowness of the American government in 
normalizing relations, led to reduced purchases of agricultural 
commodities.42 Similarly, the delivery of machinery and whole 
plant contracted in 1973-4 was not followed up with new orders, 
dropping US machinery exports to China by almost half in 1976 
and by one-fifth in 1977. 
With the recovery of domestic political stability in China in 
1977 and the renewal of momentum in the US-China relationship 
after Jimmy Carter's election, US-China trade began to grow 
significantly again. 
The announcement of the ten year program for economic 
development in February 197843 marked the beginning of a 
Chinese buying spree. Between 1978 and 1981, US exports to 
China jumped by 100-381% per year. Much of this was accounted 
for by agricultural sales, but exports of chemicals expanded 20-
fold in 3 years, manufacured goods by almost 40-fold, and 
machinery by some 700%. Similar purchases from Japan and 
Western Europe resulted in an overall Chinese trade deficit of 
$1.14 billion in 1978, $2.31 billion in 1979, and $1.28 billion in 
1980. The trade deficit with the US widened to almost $2.7 billion 
by 1980. This was symptomatic of economy-wide problems of 
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overextension.44 A large and prolonged domestic budget deficit 
forced the Chinese to scale down their expectations and to cut 
back on construction and imports. 
Composition 
With the exception of 1975-77, agricultural commodities have 
dominated US exports to China. Since 1979, foodstuffs alone have 
accounted for well over one-third of exports. When cotton and 
other farm products are added, agricultural exports in recent 
years have made up more than half of China's purchases from the 
US. (Tables 4 and 5) 
Again with the exception of US-China trade's "three bad 
years," exports of chemicals, manufactured goods and machinery 
have increased almost every year. In percentage terms, chemicals 
and manufactured goods represented only one to two percent of 
US exports to China in the early years. By the late 1970's chemical 
sales (including agricultural chemicals) accounted for more than 
10% as did manufactured goods. Machinery represented a bit 
more than 10% of US exports to China in 1973-4, jumped to 
between one-third and one-half in the mid-1970's, and returned 
to about 10% in the late-1970's. 
US exports to China began to see the result of China's policy of 
"readjustment" in 1981. Overall, sales were down by about 4% in 
1981 in current dollars.45 This reduction, however, was primarily 
due to lower agricultural sales to China, overall down 10.8% from 
1980. Wheat sales increased about 22% but soybeans, soybean 
oil, cotton and corn were all down. Machinery sales dropped by 
more than one-third, principally as a reflection of the sale of $162 
million worth of aircraft in 1980. No aircraft were sold to China in 
1981. Although petroleum equipment exports were also down, 
electrical equipment, precision equipment and telecommunica-
tions gear were all up . Nevertheless, even in percentage terms 
machinery sales dropped to an all-time low of 5.9% of US exports 
to China in 1980. 
Also in response to China's economic sectoral readjustment 
from heavy to light and consumer goods industries, US sales of 
metals and minerals were down more than 70% in 1981, but 
exports of synthetic rubber, resins and plastics were up more than 
one-third. Sales of logs and lumber more than doubled and 
exports of textile yarns tripled in 1981. 
The composition of US imports of Chinese products has also 
seen some dramatic changes. (Tables 4 and 6) In the early years 
imports were dominated by tin, bristles, raw silk, plain cotton 
fabrics, art objects and fireworks. By 1979-81, crude petroleum 
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and gasoline were the principal American purchases from China 
with carpets and finished or semi-finished textile goods taking 
strong positions. Metal and mineral ores were also major imports 
as were traditional items like feathers, fireworks, woven baskets 
and antiques. In 1981 peanuts, a one-time purchase to supple-
ment a very bad US crop, took second place among US imports 
from China. 
The fastest growing import in recent years, although still 
relatively small in absolute terms, is machinery and equipment. 
Sales of Chinese equipment in 1981 were more than 35 times the 
1979 level and included reciprocating liquid pumps, hoists and 
jacks, and a variety of other items. 
Direction 
The US has enjoyed the enviable position of a trade surplus 
with China in all but two years between 1972 and 1981. In 1980 
this surplus was more than $2.6 billion. The Chinese point out 
that this surplus extends even to the sensitive area of textiles. If 
China's 1981 imports of American textile raw materials are 
compared with the same year's sales of textile products to the US, 
America still had a $456 million surplus. 
Only examining the trade balance, however, obscures the fact 
that when the entire economic relationship is considered the 
Chinese probably break even or have a slight surplus with the US. 
Counting ' ' invisibles" such as revenues from American tourists, 
shipping, air travel and the "Hong Kong connection," some 
experts believe that "US-China financial relations weigh heavily 
in China's favor, not the other way around."4 6 In addition, in 
1981 and 1982 US imports from China grew dramatically (79.1% 
in 1981 and 20.5% in 1982) while exports dropped (by 4% and 
19% respectively). 
PROBLEMS IN THE US-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
The Chinese View 
The first and most contentious issue in US-China relations, 
which has periodically flared up and which inevitably has an 
impact on bilateral economic relations, is Taiwan. For the Chi-
nese, failure to settle this issue is a fundamental impediment to 
the development of good relations and mutual trust.47 The 
Taiwan question touches at least three raw nerves in Beijing. First 
is the legacy of unequal treatment and interference in China's 
domestic affairs which characterized China's relations with the 
west in the century before 1949. Chinese leaders remain very 
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sensitive to any implication that such a policy is being pursued, 
that the PRC's legitimacy as the only government of China is 
being questioned, or that China's "internal affairs" are being 
manipulated or decided by a "superpower." 
The second raw nerve is an actuarial one. Chinese leaders on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait are undoubtedly somewhat con-
cerned that the ardor for reunification is considerably weaker 
among their successors. Leaders like Deng Xiaoping and Ye 
Jianying want to see a speedy resolution of the matter. 
The third sensitive point for the Chinese on the Taiwan issue 
is the problem of dealing with a US government that speaks with 
more than one voice. For example, conflict between the executive 
and legislative branches, such as the different emphases of the 
Shanghai Communique and President Carter's statement on rec-
ognizing the PRC on the one hand and the Taiwan Relations Act 
on the other, confuse and frustrate China's leaders. 
In fact, understanding and coping with the US political system 
has been the second major problem for China. Particularly from 
1972-77, the Chinese were concerned about US political "in-
stability," as three administrations followed each other in less 
than three years. Similarly, the intricate relationship between the 
White House, the Congress and the courts has been both confus-
ing and frustrating to leaders in Beijing. For example, the Chinese 
were perplexed that President Carter's 1979 decision to abrogate 
the US treaty with Taiwan could be challenged in court. 
Finally, the role of other agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration and the International Trade Commission is often 
difficult for Beijing's leaders to fathom. To give just one example, 
the Chinese over the past several years have tried desperately to 
diversify their exports to the US in order to redress the trade 
imbalance.48 The Chinese understood the US-China trade agree-
ment of July 1979 as committing the US to adopting "all appropri-
ate measures to create the most favorable conditions for 
strengthening long-term development of trade between the two 
countries."4 9 In their eyes, this precludes the US from throwing 
up unnecessary discriminatory road blocks to Chinese imports 
which might help to balance off China's trade deficit. Yet the 
Chinese face repeated US industry complaints to the International 
Trade Commission seeking protection against imports of Chinese 
mushrooms, chinaware, manhole covers, steel nails, jewelry, 
footware and textiles.50 It wasn't until 1982 that the Chinese 
began to fully understand the role of federal regulatory agencies 
and retained legal counsel to represent their interests. 
The Chinese, until recently, have also underestimated the role 
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of domestic pressure groups in the US. The most celebrated recent 
example of the power of such groups over US-China trade is in 
textiles. Under strong pressure from the domestic textile industry, 
US negotiators in late 1982 and early 1983 "played hardball" 
with the Chinese over the renegotiation of the 1980 US-China 
textile agreement.51 Negotiations broke down, the US imposed 
unilateral restrictions on imports of Chinese textile goods, the 
Chinese retaliated by deciding not to purchase US cotton, soy-
beans and synthetic fibers, and discussions broke off.52 Similar 
underestimation of the political influence of US industry has been 
evident in China's reaction to disputes over canned mushrooms 
and ceramics. 
A third source of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese is 
US export control policy. Bureaucratic disputes within the US 
government and a legitimate concern over defining our national 
interest53 have combined to confuse American companies (and 
the Chinese), to slow down implementation of announced Presi-
dential policy, and to delay excessively the processing of applica-
tions for export to China of high technology items like computers. 
The Chinese are not sure whether they are considered a "friendly 
country" or a member of the "international Communist bloc." 
The US View 
Paradoxically, many American businessmen agree with the 
Chinese that US export control policy is unwise, putting them at a 
distinct competitive disadvantage vis a vis their European and 
Japanese counterparts.54 This is not to say that US companies 
have no legitimate problems to raise with the Chinese about the 
economic relationship. These problems can be lumped into three 
broad categories. 
The first general category of problems from the US perspective 
relates to infrastructure. Despite substantial progress in the last 
three years, China's legal system remains rudimentary. Many 
questions about taxation, foreign investment, arbitration and 
other matters remain unclear.55 Laws on patents and copyright 
still have not been published.5 6 
Physical infrastructure, particularly in transportation, causes 
innumerable problems for US companies.57 Backlogs and delays 
in ports58 and problems with railway transport mean late and/or 
lost shipments of goods. Supply of electricity, water, raw mate-
rials and other inputs for joint ventures has been a major concern 
of foreign investors. 
Human infrastructure is another problem, particularly for 
companies considering investing in a joint venture in China. 
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Outside the major industrial centers skilled workers and manag-
ers are the exception rather than the rule.59 In areas like Shanghai, 
Beijing and Guangzhou educated manpower is available60 but 
Chinese recruitment mechanisms are foreign to American execu-
tives, and management authority over employees remains un-
clear. 
Finally, China's organizational infrastructure is often faulty. 
The Chinese bureaucracy is often unable to agree upon and 
enforce the kinds of standards without which American com-
panies are unwilling or unable to "buy Chinese."61 
In fact, problems of bureaucracy in China are the second major 
category of problem for US companies. Business executives find 
the byzantine organizational structure of the PRC62 a constant 
source of confusion. How does one identify the appropriate 
partner? How does one find out who has ultimate authority to 
approve one's deal or investment project? How can one ensure a 
response from the Chinese to a telex or letter?63 A whole new set 
of bureaucratic problems appears once the negotiating stage has 
been reached.64 
A second troublesome aspect of China's bureaucracy is its 
capacity for inconsistent or mixed signals and for changing its 
mind. This ranges at the macro-level from deciding what China 
means at any given time by "readjustment, reform, consolidation 
and improvement" to what is happening to "decentralization."65 
But it also involves changes of bureaucratic rules or interpretation 
of legislation with specific adverse business consequences, like 
the institution of shipping container usage fees66 or the problems 
encountered by R. J. Reynolds Company with changes in import 
duties assessed on tobacco being imported for processing in 
Fujian province. 
The third type of problem can be called business facilitation 
issues.67 These range from the mundane but frustrating problems 
of obtaining housing, telexes and office help in Beijing to the 
discriminatory prices charged "foreign friends." Obtaining a visa 
to visit China is often a time-consuming and frustrating process. 
For example, in 1982, in response to the standard visa application 
processing time of some two weeks by the US embassy in Beijing, 
the Chinese let it be known that processing such an application by 
their facilities in the US would take about the same length of time. 
A more serious impediment to trade has been the dearth of 
market information and the difficulty of market access in China. 
This situation has improved substantially in 1982. Chinese pub-
lications, and affiliated agencies in Hong Kong, are disseminating 
more information of higher quality than ever before. This process 
14 
has been assisted by the involvement of the World Bank and other 
international agencies which require the Chinese to provide 
relevant information and which insist on international competi-
tive bidding for all of their loan projects. Also, in 1982 China 
published a list of 29 cities for which an internal public security 
travel pass will no longer be required by foreigners. This will be a 
major step in improving access to Chinese markets. 
OUTLOOK AND CONCLUSION 
Since the onset of "readjustment" in 1979, China's leaders 
have made considerable progress in putting the country on an 
even economic and political keel. Politically, the Deng Xiaoping-
Chen Yun coalition has taken major steps in quieting or removing 
political opponents and in transferring power to a new generation 
committed to economic improvement and reform. In agriculture, 
the institution of the "responsibility system" and the strengthen-
ing of incentives for production have led to impressive growth in 
farm output.68 Industry has undergone a substantial reorienta-
tion; consumer goods production is up, capital construction has 
been scaled back and tentative steps have been taken to improve 
management and profitability. Inflation and budget deficits, of 
great concern a few years ago, have been brought under control.69 
Finally, China's foreign trade was balanced in 1981 and enjoyed a 
$4.6 billion surplus in 1982. 
These successes have given China's leaders the confidence to 
tackle the serious problems remaining. Agricultural policy has 
led to increased production but it has also created difficulties in 
assuring balanced supply of grain and various cash crops as 
peasants respond increasingly to market forces. Similarly, the 
responsibility system encourages large families, a result at direct 
odds with China's population policy. 
Bottlenecks in energy, transportation and economic planning 
continue to plague the Chinese economy. Management and 
profitability reform in industry are hampered by failure to address 
meaningfully the problems of allocation, pricing, and responsi-
bility. Shortages of resources, including both financial and 
human, mean that national defense and science and technology 
are developing painfully slowly. 
China's Sixth Five Year Plan addresses many of these ques-
tions with admirable realism. Annual growth is expected to be 
only 4-5%; emphasis on agriculture and light and consumer 
industries will continue; renovation of existing enterprises will 
take precedence over construction of new plant; and energy 
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conservation will be coupled with the search for new production. 
The Sixth Five Year Plan is encouraging for US business as 
well. Historically the promulgation of an economic plan in China 
has been followed by increases in spending, including spending 
on imports. Moreover, the specific priority areas outlined in the 
Plan are areas in which US industry stands in a very good 
international competitive position. 
The Plan calls for a five year investment of Y17.9 billion in the 
coal industry, Y15.4 billion in petroleum, and Y20.7 billion in 
electric power (including hydropower). American companies are 
deeply involved in all of these areas in China, and the prospects 
for sales of US equipment, technology and services are very 
bright. China plans to invest some Y29.8 billion in transport and 
communications by 1985. This will open substantial oppor-
tunities for US business in port development, civil aviation and 
telecommunications.70 
China's leaders recognize that modernization is expensive and 
will emphasize purchases of new technology, major equipment 
and materials in short supply on the domestic market, and they 
realize that imports will have to grow faster than exports between 
now and 1985. 
The extent to which US business can take advantage of these 
opportunities in China depends on four factors. First is the world-
wide and US domestic recession. Until mid-1983, stringent 
economic conditions at home have virtually prevented many 
American companies from investing the time, talent and money 
necessary to explore the China market. 
The second factor is more directly dependent upon the actions 
of the US government, especially in relaxation of controls on the 
export of high technology. Quite a few positive steps have been 
taken by the government in recent years. For example, in 1982 the 
Reagan Administration asked Congress to amend both the Agri-
cultural Trade and Development Assistance Act of 1954 (PL-480) 
and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in order to remove 
prohibitions against applying these programs to China. Unfortu-
nately both bills died with the 97th Congress. The Administration 
did, however, sign into law a provision lifting the 32-year old 
embargo on seven Chinese furskins. 
Since China gained most favored nation treatment in 1980, the 
President has extended this status annually. In 1979, Vice Presi-
dent Mondale offered $2 billion in Export-Import Bank financing 
for China. Since then, Exim has made two loans worth a total of 
$117.5 million. In addition, Exim guaranteed another $8 million 
private loan. Similarly, the Overseas Private Investment Corpora-
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tion now offers political risk insurance, feasibility financing and 
loan guarantees. So far OPIC has insured seven projects in China 
for a total of $54.9 million. 
In earlier 1983, the two governments were either involved in 
or about to begin negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty and 
a bilateral tax treaty. Negotiations on a second US-China textile 
agreement broke down in January 1983, but talks were scheduled 
for March concerning the renewal of the Sino-American maritime 
agreement. Despite these promising steps, many US executives 
feel that their government should do more to help them combat 
the advantages of close cooperation between government and 
private industry which their competitors enjoy in Japan and 
Western Europe. 
The third factor determining the role of American industry in 
China's economic development will be the actions taken by the 
Chinese government to facilitate business. Here considerable 
progress has also been made in the last three years. China's 
expanding legal structure, easier access to many major Chinese 
cities, the improved flow of information, and increased confi-
dence in dealing successfully with the outside world have all 
made China a more stable and predictable place in which to do 
business. 
Finally, the extent of US-China economic relations over the 
next decade will depend in large part on the quality of US-China 
political relations. Both China and the US are emerging from a 
decade of self-doubt and are reassessing their respective roles in 
the world community. For the US this process has included a 
reassertion of a position of world leadership, a perceived neces-
sity to rebuild the American arsenal, and a willingness to confront 
the Soviet Union. For the Chinese, this reassessment has involved 
the desire to insure a peaceful international environment in 
which to pursue economic modernization. This has entailed 
efforts to relax tensions with her Soviet, and to a lesser extent 
Vietnamese, neighbors and to resume a position of leadership in 
the Third World. 
While this process of simultaneous foreign policy reassess-
ment by two great powers can be rather unsettling, it is in the long 
run of positive benefit.71 The US has historically expected too 
much, whether for good or bad, of China. This was reflected in 
the decade after the Shanghai Communique in a euphoria of 
unrealistic expectations. Similarly, in the last five years the 
Chinese have expected the US (and other foreign countries) to 
unselfishly bankroll China's economic development. Both coun-
tries have been disappointed. 
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Recent signs indicate that leaders in both Beijing and Wash-
ington are a bit more realistic about what to expect from the 
relationship.72 Particularly encouraging is the step away from 
attempting to use the US-China relationship as a "card" to play 
against the Soviet Union. During his February 1983 visit to 
Beijing, Secretary of State George Schultz went to considerable 
lengths to emphasize the American desire for "strong and last-
ing" relations with the PRC,73 relations which would be based on 
a wide variety of common interests but which would also recog-
nize the numerous areas in which the US and China do not 
agree.74 With this more realistic approach, the development of the 
US-China political relationship should be less characterized by 
what Mr. Schultz called the "roller coaster effect" of recent 
years.75 Such political stability and realism will set the founda-
tion for strong and expanding Sino-American economic ties as the 
relationship enters its second decade. 
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Table 3 
US-China Trade, 1971-82 
($ mln; % change) 
US Domestic US General 
Year Exports Imports Total Balance 
1 9 7 1 
1972 
1 9 7 3 
1974 
1 9 7 5 
t 
1976 
1 9 7 7 
1 9 7 8 
1979 
1980 
1 9 8 1 
1 9 8 2 
-
6 3 . 5 
( - ) 
7 4 0 . 2 
( + 1 , 0 6 6 ) 
8 1 9 . 1 
( + 11) 
3 0 3 . 6 
( - 6 3 ) 
1 3 5 . 4 
( - 5 5 ) 
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( + 27) 
8 2 3 . 6 
(+381) 
1 , 7 1 6 . 5 
(+108) 
3 , 7 4 9 . 0 
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3 5 9 8 . 6 
" ( - 4 ) " W 
2 , 9 0 4 . 5 
(-19V 
4 . 9 
3 2 . 4 
(+561) 
6 4 . 9 
(+100) 
1 1 4 . 7 
( + 77) 
1 5 8 . 4 
( + 3 8) 
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( + 27) 
2 0 2 . 7 
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( + 60) 
5 9 2 . 3 
( + 83) 
1 , 0 5 8 . 3 
( + 79) 
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Source: National Council for US-China Trade files. 
Table 5 
US Domestic Exports to China, 1978-82 
By Sector 
($ mln) 






















271.88 643.88 1,695.03 1,674 
206.91 453.10 1,026.81 1,073 
49.98 
Consumer Goods 37 9.2 2 
foods 377.55 
64.05 184.81 159, 
601.51 1,432.07 1,476. 

















Source: National Council for US-China Trade, US-China Trade 
Statistics, 1981, US-China Trade Statistics, 1982. 
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Table 6 
US Imports for Consumption from China, 1978-82 
By Sector 
($US million) 
1978 . 1979 . 1980 . 1981 . 1982 
Machinery and 
Equipment 0.53 0.86 5.75 40.46 45.08 
Industrial 
Supplies 160.16 262.58 505.12 820.78 1,092.62 
minerals & 
metals 37.78 59.25 154.92 205.26 193.93 
petroleum & 
products negl. 96.44 131.57 295.43 580.17 
chemicals 20.08 18.71 49.44 65.49 70.52 
agriculture-
derived 
supplies 40.97 34.58 55.28 50.00 42.88 
Consumer Goods 155.07 280.02 525.73 959.54 1,071.77 
textile 


































Source: National Council for US-China Trade, US-China Trade Statistics, 1982. 

PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S 
AGRICULTURE: GROWTH AND 
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TRADE 
Steven B. Butler 
Now that China has become a fairly important market for many 
American products, it is easy to forget that just a few years ago we 
considered China to be extremely isolated, in large part because 
China's leaders did not want to engage heavily in foreign trade. 
China did not want to become dependent on foreign trading 
partners for essential goods, a lesson driven home both by 
American embargos against China following the start of the 
Korean War, and also China's treatment at the hands of the 
Soviets. Foreign trade, however, is intimately linked to economic 
development in China, and in every period in which China's 
leaders have emphasized growth, foreign trade has shot up. 
Nonetheless, there is no reason to think that Chinese aversion to 
foreign trade has disappeared. What China has sought to pur-
chase, and has needed for economic growth, is foreign technology 
and industrial goods. 
Any other imports are a bow to necessity. Yet in recent years 
China has also purchased a wide variety of consumer goods in 
order to boost domestic standards of living quickly, although it 
now intends to curtail such imports. It has also been forced to 
import a great deal of agricultural products, in particular cotton, 
sugar, and wheat. We used to take it as axiomatic that China 
would have to strive for self-sufficiency in food production, if 
only for security reasons. But China's imports of food grains have 
risen annually from just over 2 million tons in 1976 to a historical 
high of about 15 million tons in 1982. In the context of a world-
wide recession, depressed agricultural prices, and abundant 
supplies, we should consider this a boon to American farmers. 
Much of the wheat eaten in Peking may be grown in the U.S. But 
this relationship may or may not continue, and it is that question 
that I would like to consider in more detail, first by looking at 
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trends in China's recent agricultural production and foreign 
trade, and then by examining a number of specific problem areas: 
in particular, China's marketing and pricing policies, recent 
changes in labor management and incentives, and both the short 
and long run constraints imposed by China's huge population 
and its overstretched resource and ecosystem. 
An Overview 
I think largely because of China's reputation for having solved 
its food problem, we may overlook in reality how much China is 
integrated into the world food system. China is one of the world's 
largest producers of grain and feeds over one-fifth of the world's 
population. Although it has tried to achieve self sufficiency in 
food grain production, it has failed. It has usually exported rice to 
take advantage of the relatively higher price for rice in the world 
market, and imported wheat, making it a net importer of grain. 
But the level of its imports, unlike other large importers except for 
the Soviet Union, has tended to fluctuate somewhat unpredicta-
bly. China imported a great deal of grain following the Great Leap 
Forward in the early 1960s, it imported large quantities of grain in 
1973 and 1974 following bad harvests, and since 1976 its grain 
imports have once again grown rapidly. Because China's popula-
tion and production account for such a large portion of world 
supply and demand, a relatively small change in production or 
demand can have a major impact on the world market. 
President Carter's Secretary of Agriculture, Bob Bergland, is 
quoted as having made the following remark in 1978, "If each of 
China's 900 million people [and there are a billion now] were to 
consume just one additional pound of grain a week [an increase of 
less than 10%], it would add 21 million metric tons to the 
worldwide demand. That tonnage is equal, in terms of wheat to 
all the wheat now grown in Canada, or the total amount of wheat 
consumed in the U.S. in all forms, from bread to liquor." Clearly, 
we need to consider China's food imports not only from the point 
of view of whether they are good for American farmers, but 
whether the world food supply and production system can cope 
with a failure of China's domestic production to meet growing 
demand. To everyone's surprise, for the first time China re-
quested international food relief from the United Nations in 1980 
following a serious drought in North China and flooding in the 
middle Yangtze. As China's modernization drive proceeds, un-
doubtedly the demand for improved diets, meaning more meat, 
will also mount. That demand will translate directly or indirectly 
to an increased per-capita demand for food grains. China's per-
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capita consumption of grain now is quite low, but a relatively 
small percentage increase would add greatly to worldwide de-
mand for food. China's economy as a whole may well grow 
rapidly enough to pay for food imports at a much higher level, but 
the question is whether the world can meet such demands. 
Most reports on the performance of China's agricultural econ-
omy right up until the end of the 1970s tended to be relatively 
favorable. Scholars and other observers usually complimented 
China for managing to keep grain production just ahead of 
population growth and they felt China had no major inefficiencies 
in production. I think it is fair to say that the consensus among 
scholars has shifted fairly drastically by now. 
In the 1950s, production recovered steadily from wartime 
disruption. The state began to impose mandatory procurement 
quotas on agricultural produce in 1953, but at that time prices 
were only marginally below what free market prices would have 
been. Collectivization proceeded relatively smoothly and did not 
lead to a major disruption of production. The Great Leap Forward, 
however, changed all of this. From 1958 to 1960, production 
dropped by about 25%. The latest research indicates that 14 to 16 
million persons may have died as a result. The government raised 
prices again in 1962, and production began to recover. In 1966, 
grain production finally surpassed the record high of 200 million 
tons achieved 8 years earlier in 1958, but by then, of course, 
China's population was much higher. Per capita production did 
not attain 1958 levels until 20 years later in 1978. 
The record in grain production in these years would not look 
so bad if it were compensated for by achievements in other areas 
of agricultural production. Unfortunately production of oil bear-
ing crops, soy beans, and cotton all failed to keep up with 
population growth. Rural consumption of food oils declined some 
40% over the period, and diets on average declined in quality. Of 
course, averages do not tell the entire story. In some places in 
China, diets must have improved, but elsewhere, restrictions on 
interregional trade forced villages to subsist on what they could 
produce themselves. Often this was not enough to provide a 
decent living. The Chinese press disclosed in 1980 that some 200 
million people were living below China's poverty line of 40 yuan 
per capita per year, and that over 100 million people did not have 
enough to eat. 
In the late 1970s, however, the government introduced a series 
of reforms that have fairly well turned the situation around. Grain 
production began to spurt ahead in 1977, largely because of the 
rapid increases in fertilizer supply in those years. Production 
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leveled off after 1979 until 1982, which finally broke the '79 
record with a harvest of 344.3 million metric tons. But the 
lackluster performance in grain production is well compensated 
for by recent rapid increases in the production of cotton, food oil, 
sugar, and meat. Rural incomes have also gone up rapidly, in part 
because of the price increases, which amounted to a 23% boost in 
1979 alone, and also because of the government's encouragement 
of collective and household sideline production. Government 
surveys show that rural income reached 224 yuan per capita in 
1981, going up a whopping 16% per year since 1979. The surveys 
almost certainly exaggerate the increases due to sampling errors, 
but the increase has been substantial. 
China's financial and trade situation has also improved re-
cently. The price boost in 1979 contributed 7.8 billion yuan to a 
record budget deficit of 17 billion yuan in 1979, but in 1982, that 
budget gap was narrowed to 3 billion yuan, in large part due to 
increased revenues rather than slashed spending. China has also 
managed to cut down its trade deficit with the United States 
which in 1980 reached 2.7 billion dollars. Three years of bumper 
crops in cotton and sugar have led to reduced imports of these 
commodities, although as mentioned, grain imports remain at a 
historical high. 
In sum, China's agricultural production experienced a long 
period of stagnation, and only a few recent years of relatively 
rapid growth. Our questions are what has caused this pattern, 
what does it imply about the near and long term prospects for 
future growth, and what are the implications for foreign trade? I 
should note that there is no very scientific way to provide clear-
cut answers to these questions. Many policy changes have taken 
place at once, which makes it impossible to sort out and separate 
their individual effects. I have my own hunches about which 
factors are most important, and I will indicate them, but they 
remain educated guesses. 
Economic Policy 
Until his death in 1976, Mao Zedong's ideas dominated the 
formation of economic policy. These ideas included a strong 
distrust of material incentives, a fear of increasing income in-
equalities in the villages, a belief that villages should be ''self-
reliant," and a prejudice against regional specialization in pro-
duction. Some of these ideas affect China's organization and 
management of labor, which I will consider in a moment. But first 
I will note their effect on prices and marketing policies. 
In the first serious discussion of prices in at least a decade, in 
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1978 commentators in the Chinese press said that prices long had 
been literally a ' 'forbidden zone," a topic off limits, too sensitive 
to discuss during the Cultural Revolution years of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. The effect during those years was to freeze 
agricultural purchase prices at a very low level at a time when the 
costs of production were rapidly escalating. 
Dahe Commune, where I conducted field research for half a 
year in 1980, provides a good illustration of the effects of the price 
structure. Dane is, at least now, an average, non-model commune 
in a relatively prosperous area on the North China plain. It is 
about 20 miles to the north-west of Shiziazhuang, the capital of 
Hebei Province, outside of its surburban district. From 1969 to 
1976, Dahe doubled its yields of multiple cropped grain, from 
about 4.5 metric tons per hectare to about 9 tons per hectare, 
putting it on a par with the world's most productive farmers. It 
did this first of all by building and improving canals that connect 
it to the Gangnan Reservoir system in the Taihang Mountains. 
Each year it drilled more tube wells to tap its very stable, 
relatively shallow underground water supply. It began to pur-
chase more and more agricultural machinery, although it used 
tractors more for transportation than field preparation or har-
vesting. Each year fertilizer applications increased, as did the use 
of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals. In 1974, the 
commune adopted a new "triple-cropping" system. It was not a 
true triple cropping system of three sequential plantings. Rather, 
there were two staggered plantings of corn in the spring between 
rows of maturing winter wheat, one planting in wider spaces 
about a month before the wheat harvest, and another between the 
more narrowly spaced rows closer to harvest time. The new 
system produced an immediate jump in yields since the earlier 
planting of corn was less susceptible to cold weather in the fall. It 
increased the intensity of labor bottlenecks, since wheat could no 
longer be harvested by machine. And it also increased seed, 
fertilizer and water requirements. 
At the start of the period, the costs of production took 
approximately 25% of the commune's gross agricultural income. 
By 1976, that figure rose to over 50%, more than wiping out any 
possible increased profit. The commune actually made less 
money producing twice the amount of grain. 
There are several comments to be made about this achieve-
ment. First it does illustrate the unfavorable price ratio between 
agricultural and industrial goods. In spite of the fact that histori-
cally this ratio has improved, yet because farmers used more and 
more expensive modern inputs they ended up losing money. But 
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second, the remarkable increase in yields in the face of such 
unfavorable circumstances is a convincing testament to the 
strength of China's bureaucratic system, at least in some places. 
Most Chinese commentaries on the failures of the period criticize 
bureaucratic meddling in the economy, but not all bureaucrats are 
incompetent and they would not have been forced to tell farmers 
what to plant and how to plant it if there had been an effective 
economic incentive to do so. Bureaucratic mismanagement, in my 
view, is less the cause of China's agricultural problems than it is 
an understandable reaction to unfavorable prices. 
Similarly, Mao's enthusiasm for "self-reliance" placed even 
tighter restrictions on what farmers could do; it prevented them 
from specializing in crops best suited to their own conditions. I 
find the rationale for self-reliance still something of a mystery. 
Part of the reason may have been economic. China's grain 
ministry was not making money on grain trade, and it may simply 
have wanted to reduce transportation and handling costs. Self-
reliance may also have had strategic implications. A nation not 
dependent on specialized regional trade would be less vulnerable 
to piecemeal invasion. And this was a period in which the 
Chinese were highly conscious of a potential Soviet threat. But 
Mao seemed to regard self-reliance as a moral virtue in its own 
right. The model village Dazhai, which has since been completely 
discredited, supposedly exemplified what every Chinese village 
could do if it tried concertedly to pull itself up by its own 
bootstraps. 
But whatever the rationale, the effects are fairly clear. The 
policy of forcing villages to grow their own food reversed trends 
dating back centuries toward greater regional specialization based 
on comparative advantage. Areas on the North China plain that 
had increasingly specialized in cotton production as transporta-
tion improved during the 20th century had to cut back on cotton 
in order to feed themselves. As a result, by the late 1970s, China 
had become a huge importer of cotton, wasting precious foreign 
exchange on a crop it could have produced more efficiently at 
home. The story repeats itself in different variations for sugar 
production, food oils, and meat in pastoral areas. Many areas in 
the northwest had to cultivate grasslands that were quite unsuit-
able for grain cultivation. They produced low yields, and, worse, 
led to serious soil erosion. In short, self-reliance reduced effi-
ciency in the allocation of resources; it caused waste. China could 
have done much better with the resources it put into agricultural 
modernization. 
Since Mao's death, of course, China has changed both its price 
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and marketing policies. Prices have gone up substantially and 
regional specialization has increased. Productivity has also gone 
up. But it is not easy to sort out all the causes and effects involved, 
nor fully to explain the intent of policy. 
First of all, it is not clear that price increases alone can account 
for the increase in productivity. China's leaders may have raised 
prices simply to give the peasants a better deal, to improve their 
standard of living. Even after the price boost, for example, free 
market prices for grain may be as much as 100% higher than the 
average price the state pays, and well above its higher "over the 
quota" price. And rather than stimulating production, after the 
hike in grain prices farmers have reduced grain acreage, and the 
percentage of output sold to the state has not gone up signifi-
cantly. Grain, to farmers, is still worth more than the state will 
pay for it, and the ratio between industrial and agricultural prices 
remains much higher than in other developing Asian nations. In 
absolute and relative terms, grain prices are still fairly low. 
Likewise, cotton price increases in 1978 and 1979 did not 
result in expanded acreage for cotton. Only after the state guaran-
teed an adequate supply of grain to cotton producers in 1980, did 
production spurt up. Hebei Province actually doubled its cotton 
production that year. Despite the unfavorably low prices of 
agricultural commodities, prices were apparently less of an 
impediment to increasing production than the lack of a guaran-
teed food supply. 
But whatever the intent and the effect of the price boosts, the 
government has decided to postpone any further price adjust-
ments for the foreseeable future. As usual, the government was 
afraid to raise food prices in the city when it raised the purchase 
prices, and resulting losses in urban food subsidies are stagger-
ing. In fact China's leaders have become nervous about many 
aspects of the reforms. The government has stressed for the past 
year that peasants must not reduce any further the acreage planted 
in grain. In April 1982 it announced that inter-provincial transfers 
of grain would remain frozen at the current level for three years. 
These moves threaten to halt basically healthy trends toward 
greater specialization and efficiency in farm production based on 
comparative advantage. The freezing of these more progressive 
policies may or may not be temporary, but the change is disturb-
ing. 
Instead of specialization, the government now intends to rely 
principally on technical transformation to increase productivity 
further. This is a long range investment that is bound to pay off. It 
will take many years to make up for the damage caused by the 
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Cultural Revolution, but without a vigorous input from Chinese 
agricultural scientists, China's agriculture cannot progress. This 
is particularly true since China's cropping systems are so unique. 
Foreign technology cannot simply be imported and applied. 
Nonetheless, without a more rational price structure and the 
freedom to specialize, farmers may never have the opportunity to 
adopt new technology, and to make decisions in an environment 
that allows for maximum economic efficiency. 
Before moving on to discuss recent organizational changes in 
the countryside, I might note that all of the changes so far 
discussed have not altered the basic character of the Chinese 
economy. It is still planned and socialist. Prices still do not give 
farmers the signals that would encourage them to produce what 
China's economic planners want. Despite all the talk of reducing 
administrative interference in the economy, administrators still 
tell farmers what to plant, how much to sell to the state, and at 
what price. It is still a command economy largely modeled on that 
of the Soviet Union. 
Labor Management 
More than price and marketing policy, the return of a house-
hold-based farming system is what has really attracted public 
attention in recent years. Now that the green light has been given, 
some 70% of China's farmers have decided to divide up the land 
that they have been farming collectively since 1956, and farm it 
with their family members instead. This is a development that 
just a few years ago practically no specialists on rural China 
would have predicted. Parish and Whyte, in their seminal study 
of rural society, basically concluded that peasants had accepted 
and learned to live with the collective system, and that it had 
affected a wide range of social customs. In my own interviews 
conducted in Hong Kong in 1977 with recent refugees and 
emigres, I rarely heard a wholesale rejection of collective agricul-
ture. In fact, many refugees praised the welfare aspects of the 
system, the fact that peasants were guaranteed a basic subsis-
tence. 
Nonetheless, many able-bodied workers were apparently un-
happy with the system and were willing to try something differ-
ent. And it is not hard to understand their points of unhappiness. 
The collectives had to operate under a variety of policies that 
reduced material incentives and generally placed a wide-range of 
restrictions on their activities. And, as we have already shown, 
the standard of living under the collective system did not really 
improve that much for most Chinese peasants. 
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Some of the problems began in the mid-1960s, when Mao 
discovered and promoted Dazhai as the national model for 
agricultural development. This encouraged in the late 1960s, and 
again about 1976, a national movement to create larger collective 
units. Production brigades, generally equivalent to large natural 
villages containing some 200 households, would become the 
units of collective agriculture rather than the smaller production 
teams, which contained only 30 to 50 families. The larger 
collectives were often too unwieldy to manage, and cadres were 
never able to create the necessary mutual trust and confidence 
among members to make the collectives work smoothly. Often 
wealthier teams had to take a cut in income, or hostile villages or 
lineage branches were forced together. 
The Dazhai system for awarding work points probably pro-
moted a more equal distribution of income in many villages, but it 
usually failed to reward peasants who worked harder. Chinese 
peasants were paid in work points, the value of which would not 
be known until the year-end settling of accounts. In the Dazhai 
system, peasants evaluated their contributions retrospectively 
and were supposed to include political attitudes as one of the 
criteria. But peasants often could not agree on how much their 
contributions to the team efforts were worth, and most teams 
eventually began to award most able-bodied men more or less the 
same amount of points just to avoid controversy. Women gener-
ally earned somewhat fewer points, regardless of how they 
worked. Many villages, especially in Guangdong, modified the 
system and began to use task rates—awarding points for the 
amount accomplished rather than the time spent working—but 
material incentives were not strong or direct in most places. 
Under the new system, which China calls the ''responsibility 
system," each production team signs a contract with groups of 
peasants, individuals, or households, to cultivate an assigned 
piece of land. When the harvest comes in the farmers will either 
give the entire crop to the team and receive work points, or give 
only an agreed amount and keep any surplus for their own 
income. Either way, the material incentive is strong and direct. 
When I was in China, I witnessed team cadres in Dahe trying 
out the new system, and they reported instant success. They 
reported that peasants worked faster and much more carefully. No 
longer did they spend their time browbeating friends and neigh-
bors to show up for work on time and work till the quitting bell. In 
a place like Dahe, where the economy is fairly lively, it left more 
time to work on sideline enterprises, which peasants use to boost 
their cash income. 
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I have no doubt that this new system has simplified manage-
ment tasks for local cadres, and that it has raised the efficiency of 
agricultural labor. To the extent that peasants in more prosperous 
regions of the country can fill their new-found free time with 
other non-agricultural productive activities, the system will help 
to raise peasant incomes. But I have some doubts about how much 
impact the system has had on raising agricultural productivity per 
se. If China's problem has been a surplus of labor and under- and 
unemployment, then what difference would it make if peasants 
worked harder and faster? The unfavorable price structure and the 
restrictions on what peasants could produce already created 
severe management problems for production team leaders. Many 
teams were prevented from distributing extra food to team mem-
bers when they had a bumper harvest. They had to put any extra 
income into savings rather than distribute it to team members. 
Many teams had to contribute labor for construction projects from 
which they received little benefit. All of these restrictions meant 
that higher level cadres had to spend their time prodding and 
pushing the teams along so they would do what they were 
supposed to do. Sometimes this included mandating new plant-
ing methods that did not work, although very often they did 
work. But the point is that China could have achieved an 
improvement in agricultural productivity without changing the 
system of managing labor. For a whole range of reasons, I believe 
that the new system is superior to the previous one, but I don't 
think it is the main reason that agricultural productivity has risen 
in recent years, as most Chinese commentaries on the subject 
would indicate. It is instead relaxation of restrictions in these 
other areas that has had, in my opinion, a more immediate and 
decisive impact. 
What we have seen in recent years then is a reduction in the 
acreage devoted to grain cultivation and a greater latitude for 
some areas to specialize in cash crops better suited to their 
growing conditions. Sugar, cotton, food oils, and meat produc-
tion are all up significantly; grain production has stagnated, and 
in 1982 rose slightly. In the trade for cash crops as against grain, 
China has gained. The gross value of agricultural output has gone 
up some 5.6% annually since 1979, well above the historical 
average of 2.9% from the mid-fifties to the late 1970s. It has 
enabled China in 1982 to reduce greatly the level of imports for 
most agricultural commodities except for grain. China is making a 
more rational use of its agricultural resources, but it has not 
4 'solved" its food supply problem. China depends heavily on the 
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world market to feed its population, and I believe there is a good 
chance that that dependence may well grow over time. 
Population and Resources 
Before discussing what future trends in foreign trade might be, 
we need to examine another area that will be critical to China's 
future—the balance between population and resources. China's 
need for food obviously depends on how many people it must 
feed, in addition to how well it wants to feed them. 
There are two schools of thought as to why China's population 
growth rate has fallen in recent years. One holds that while the 
availability of contraceptives and health services is a necessary 
ingredient, it is primarily caused by economic and social 
changes. For example, when women work outside of the home, as 
they do now in many more prosperous Chinese villages, raising 
children becomes more of a burden. When there is some kind of 
retirement pension system, as there is for state employees, chil-
dren are no longer needed for support in old age. According to 
this line of reasoning, the recent changes in work organization 
will also encourage larger families since there would be more 
hands to work the plot of land assigned to the family. If this 
theory is correct, China's population growth rate depends prin-
cipally on the rate of economic development. Cities and pros-
perous villages will be able to cut their birth rates, while the vast 
stretches of poor and poverty-stricken villages will produce more 
and more children. The outlook for China's population growth is 
rather pessimistic under this interpretation. 
A second approach, however, argues that sheer administrative 
and social pressure combined with effective delivery of health 
services can substantially reduce the rate of population increase. 
People in this school would have to be called the optimists, or 
perhaps the closet totalitarians. 
My own view is that while administrative pressure can make 
some difference, peasants, being rational creatures, will have 
children when it is in their material interest to do so. For most 
peasants the thought of facing old age with only one child to 
support them, especially if that child is a daughter, is frightening. 
As we know, the government policy now is to encourage one 
child families throughout China, and it has adopted fairly strong 
rewards and sanctions to implement the policy. My guess is that 
in the short run, reports will indicate that the policy is succeeding 
fairly well, either because of real short-run successes, or because 
of widespread falsification of reporting by local political officials 
under strong pressure to show good results. But when women 
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who take the pledge to limit themselves to one child begin to 
reach the end of their fertility, the prospect of a poverty-stricken 
old age may grow too frightening. Many couples may be willing 
to suffer the short run financial penalties in order to secure a more 
comfortable retirement. 
Even under the most optimistic of Chinese projections, the 
population will grow by 200 million, some 20%, to 1.2 billion by 
the end of the century because China's population is so young. 
That is an addition nearly equivalent to the current population of 
the US, and all of them will have to eat. However, I think it is 
more likely that the population will actually grow faster than 
these optimistic projections indicate. China will need to work 
very hard just to make food production keep up with this growth 
in population. If it wishes to improve diets, as the Chinese people 
are surely going to demand, it will need a major breakthrough in 
production. 
Furthermore, China's problems of providing for its population 
with its limited resources were seriously compounded over the 
past two decades by mismanagement of the environment (see a 
forthcoming monograph by Vaclav Smil). By forcing pastoral 
people in the Northwest to grow their own grain, it made them 
plow under the fragile grasslands, causing a sharp increase in 
wind erosion. Silt in the Yellow River has increased 25% since 
the 1950s. As far away as Beijing, the frequency of days of 
sandstorms has increased by about 20% from the 1960s to the 
1970s. 
Deforestation in Heilongjiang Province has caused a decline in 
annual rainfall of one-third in twenty-five years. In Sichuan, two 
biologists have warned that because of the felling of large num-
bers of trees in the upper reaches of the Min River, the Chengdu 
plain is in danger of becoming a desert within a few decades. That 
plain is the heartland of China's most populous province. 
Throughout the entire middle and lower Yangtze, communes 
reclaimed lake and river areas in order to plant grain. Hubei 
Province lost some 75% of its lake surface area. Naturally, aquatic 
production declined as a result, but the loss of drainage area 
seriously compounded the effects of a devastating flood that 
struck the area in 1980, causing China to seek international food 
aid. 
Water supply in North China remains a very serious problem. 
The area has been suffering from a long term drought that began 
in the early 1970s. Last year, Beijing and Tianjin had to invoke 
emergency measures to bring in water from the Yellow River. 
Many tube wells on the North China plain have gone dry as the 
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water table falls with excessive use. China's leaders have long 
toyed with the idea of diverting water from the Yangtze River to 
the north. But the project would have uncertain ecological effects, 
and would be enormously expensive. 
Conclusion 
In short, China faces enormous problems of population and 
environment in addition to those of planning and organization. I 
should say that I am more optimistic about China's economy as a 
whole. Currently China faces severe bottlenecks in energy, trans-
portation, and communication. These bottlenecks may well 
plague the economy for the rest of this decade. But China is one of 
the world's great continental economies, comparable to the 
United States, the Soviet Union, or Europe as a whole, in the 
range and abundance of resources that it has to draw on. Presently 
these resources are not well developed, but they will be. In the 
1990s, China will have a much easier time managing its industrial 
economy. 
But agriculture is likely to be a continuing problem. Given the 
range of difficulties I have outlined, I think China will be quite 
successful if it manages to hold imports to more or less the current 
levels. If that happens, China's relationship with the international 
agricultural market will be somewhat similar to that of the Soviet 
Union. It will buy large amounts of agricultural commodities, 
especially grain, and the problem for the rest of the world will be 
in trying to adjust to unpredictable fluctuations in Chinese 
demand caused by weather or perhaps political factors. If China 
succeeds with its industrial development, it can afford to pay for 
food imports. And the major exporters of agricultural com-
modities will likely be able to supply China's needs at that level. 
We should not rule out, of course, a major technological 
breakthrough that would allow China's agricultural production to 
improve dramatically. There are both optimists and pessimists 
among those who study world food-supply problems. 
But I think a more likely danger is that China will impose ever 
greater demands on the world food supply system. This is 
particularly possible because at some point, China's people will 
demand improvement in their diets. And, as we have shown, a 
relatively small improvement in the average Chinese diet could 
have a large impact on the world food supply. 
Because of the large number of factors involved, China's future 
agricultural import needs are unpredictable. The mix of what 
China imports may change as its agricultural plans evolve. There 
may well be occasional frictions as China seeks to expand its 
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exports, particularly of textiles, to the United States. But given 
the fact that there are few major net exporters of agricultural 
commodities, and assuming that there is no major political 
breakdown between the United States and China, I think that 
American farmers will have a large China market for some time to 
come. 
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ENERGY IN CHINA: PARADOXES, 
POLICIES, AND PROSPECTS 
Thomas Fingar 
Introduction 
Twenty-one American oil firms have submitted bids to the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for the right to 
explore for petroleum on China's southern continental shelf. The 
Atlantic Richfield Corporation, which signed a contract with 
CNOOC on September 19, 1982, has already begun exploratory 
drilling south of Hainan Island. Occidental Petroleum has signed 
a contract to do a feasibility study for a major coal mine in North 
China. As part of the US-PRC Hydropower Protocol signed in 
1979, the Army Corps of Engineers is advising the Chinese 
Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric Power on a major 
project in Southwest China. China's search for new supplies of 
energy promises to tie the country to the United States—and to 
the world economy in general—in complex and unprecedented 
ways. 
As natural as this may seem to Americans, China's leaders 
have been very reluctant to allow foreign corporations to play a 
major role in the development of China's energy resources. Their 
reluctance stems from a mixture of pride, fear, and inexperience. 
They were—and still are—proud of China's indigenous ca-
pabilities, fearful of becoming dependent on and victimized by 
foreign firms, and unfamiliar with the technical, financial, and 
legal requisites of large-scale joint ventures with capitalist firms. 
If they could, they would prefer to rely on outsiders only to a 
limited extent; for example, for advanced equipment that China 
cannot produce. Indeed, the policies first adopted by Mao's 
successors embodied precisely this approach. It made superficial 
good sense, but soon foundered on historical, logistical, techni-
cal, and political obstacles. By the late 1970s, shortages of fuel 
and power had become chronic, in spite of the fact that China 
The original version of this paper was commissioned by the China Council of the 
Asia Society. 
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produces more commercial energy than all but a handful of 
nations. 
The current approach recognizes the difficulties involved in 
opening new mines and oil fields and in sustaining production in 
older fields. China probably could develop its energy resources 
without foreign assistance, but neither the country nor the politi-
cal leadership can afford further delay. Energy demand and the 
Chinese populace's expectations for a higher standard of living 
are rising inexorably. Forced to choose between economic stagna-
tion and popular dissatisfaction, on the one hand, and partial 
reliance on foreign firms on the other, the leadership has opted for 
a less restricted definition of self-reliance. But the door to the 
capitalist world could be pushed shut by the forces that made self-
reliance so attractive in the first place. 
THE INITIAL POST-MAO ENERGY POLICY 
The strategy of development adopted shortly after the death of 
Mao Zedong and purge of the ''gang of four" in 1976 assumed 
that energy production could and would increase steadily. This 
was a critical assumption because large and rapidly growing 
amounts of fuel and power were needed to realize the "four 
modernizations'' (agriculture, industry, national defense, and 
science and technology). This would enhance the legitimacy of 
the Communist Party and the "socialist system" by restoring 
political and economic stability, improving economic perfor-
mance, and generating tangible and substantial social benefits. 
Without expanded energy supplies, it would be impossible to 
achieve promised improvements in the performance of farms and 
factories. Mechanization was supposed to raise agricultural out-
put while easing the lot of peasantry. Freed from the "irrational" 
(i.e., political) constraints imposed by the discredited "gang of 
four," industry was to provide consumer goods for town and 
countryside alike. Chinese planners believed all this was possible 
because they assumed that energy would be cheap and abundant. 
This ambitious modernization effort was to be financed as well 
as fueled by the country's energy resources. Exports, primarily of 
crude oil, were expected to earn vast amounts of foreign ex-
change. Revenue from oil sales would, in turn, be used to 
purchase advanced technologies, complete industrial plants, and 
other ingredients needed for China to leapfrog across intermedi-
ate stages of development to become a "powerful, modern, 
socialist state" by the end of the century. Again, obtaining 
adequate supplies of energy was treated as a nonproblem. 
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Why were China's leaders so sanguine about the country's 
ability to meet its new energy needs at a time when growing 
concern about a current or impending "energy crisis" was a 
major issue in most capitals? 
First of all, they knew that their country had vast deposits of 
fossil fuels. Although the precise magnitude of China's reserves is 
uncertain, because much of the country remains unexplored and 
the quality of available data is uneven, they clearly are substan-
tial. Recoverable coal reserves are now estimated at more than 600 
billion metric tons (bmt), roughly the same magnitude as those of 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Estimates of both total 
and recoverable oil reserves vary widely but, on the basis of 
current information, probably fall within the range of 3-10 bmt. In 
the mid-1970s, when the initial plan was being drafted, Chinese 
officials frequently used substantially higher figures when de-
scribing their country's potential. Little is known about the size of 
natural gas deposits, but they too are impressive—perhaps on a 
par with those of the United States. China also has the largest 
theoretical hydropower potential in the world (500 million kilo-
watts); less than 5 percent of this potential has been tapped. 
But resources in the ground do not fuel economic develop-
ment; they must be exploited. Here too, Chinese leaders had 
cause for optimism because by any standard their country had 
achieved stedy, even dramatic production increases. Table 1 
below illustrates what had been achieved. 
TABLE 1 



































NOTES: Units are as follows: Coal, million metric tons 
Oil, million metric tons 
Natural Gas, billion cubic meters 
Electricity, billion kilowatt hours 
SOURCE: Chinese government reports and UN statistics 
Finally, assumptions about future earnings from oil exports 
were buttressed by favorable market conditions. OPEC-led price 
increases and the scramble to find alternatives to Mideast oil 
seemed to bode well. Growing foreign interest in Chinese fields, 
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where production increases had reached roughly 20 percent per 
year in the mid-1970s, also contributed to the general sense of 
optimism about the future. 
In retrospect it is clear—to the Chinese as well as to outside 
observers—that the post-Mao leadership had too rosy a view of 
the country's energy balance. But it is important to point out that 
they had lots of company. It has been less than a decade since the 
Arab oil embargo and predictions of impending energy crises 
forced political leaders around the globe to focus on and learn 
more about the production, transport, and use of energy. Others 
also made easy but erroneous projections on the basis of past 
experience. However, the Chinese had—and still face—four spe-
cial problems in perceiving and responding to the new verities, 
namely, problems of logistics, history, technology, and politics. 
Logistics 
China's leaders appear to have assumed that the exploration 
and exploitation of fuel and power resources would follow the 
same general pattern as that found in China's recent past or the 
experience of other nations. But such reasoning by analogy was 
misleading. Major producing areas (for example, the giant Daqing 
((Ta-ch'ing)) oilfield and the Kailan coal complex) have been 
exploited first both because they are located near industrial 
centers, and, more importantly, because they are easiest to 
develop. In contrast, most of the larger untapped reserves, es-
pecially of hydropower but also of oil, coal, and natural gas, are in 
remote, inaccessible areas. Each new investment will be more 
difficult, more costly, and more technically demanding. The 
Chinese will have to face such obstacles as transport over long 
distances and difficult terrain, removal of heavy overburdens atop 
coal seams, working in deep water and violent weather in 
promising offshore areas, and unusually heavy silt loads in major 
rivers. These problems are not insoluble, but they are certainly 
more formidable than was appreciated in the 1970s and may be 
more difficult than China can handle, at least in the short run. 
History 
The Chinese approach to energy development under Mao 
shaped the perceptions of his successors in three important ways. 
The first was a strong faith in self-reliant mobilization. Chinese 
leaders are justifiably proud of the Daqing oilfield, which is 
located in a remote and harsh region of the country and now 
supplies roughly half of China's annual production. Daqing was 
built without foreign assistance. Successes in the expansion of 
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coal mines, development of small-scale and a few large hydro-
power projects, and in tapping Sichuan's rich reserves of natural 
gas also contributed to the general sense of optimism. 
All this suggested that even the most formidable obstacles to 
further exploitation of known reserves could be overcome. China 
had scored great accomplishments in the past and could surely do 
so again, especially since the country was no longer shackled by 
the infamous "gang of four," or so many leaders thought in 
1976-77. For example, officials and media commentaries pro-
claimed that it was possible to open "ten new Daqings" by 1985. 
Second, history constrained as well as misled political offi-
cials. The "Soviet model" of economic development, adopted in 
the 1950s, stressed heavy, energy-intensive industry, and relied 
on extensive rather than intensive growth. This approach ignored 
energy efficiencies: efficiency did not matter because fuel and 
power were underpriced and no competitive or other mechanisms 
existed to induce efforts to limit costs. As a result, China has 
hundreds of thousands of aging and energy inefficient enterprises 
and a deeply ingrained approach to capital investment that makes 
it difficult to switch to more efficient, less energy-intensive 
construction and retrofitting. Moreover, since efficiency mattered 
little for thirty years, tens of thousands of enterprises continue to 
operate, even though they waste resources and serve more of a 
welfare than a production function. (According to official figures 
more than 25 percent of state-run enterprises operate at a loss.) 
The technically or economically rational course is clear, but it is 
extremely difficult to change attitudes, expectations, and behav-
ior, or to close factories that waste energy. 
The third historical legacy is the government's near continu-
ous failure to devote adequate attention or resources to the energy 
and transportation sectors. Despite considerable rhetoric and a 
few major achievements, construction of mines, oilfields, rail-
ways, transmission lines, pipelines and highways failed to keep 
pace with the growing demand for fuel and power in the cities 
and rural areas. This failure is particularly striking in a state 
which advocates central planning and claims an almost religious 
faith in the advantages of planned development. Decades of 
neglect cannot be overcome in just a few years. 
Technology 
The geographical, geological and other logistical factors noted 
above combine in ways that preclude rapid development of 
energy resources without substantial infusion of advanced tech-
nology; both equipment and know-how. China has done quite 
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well with the technologies acquired from the Soviet Union in the 
1950s, but, generally speaking, has pushed those technologies 
about as far as they could be pushed. Tapping deeper oil deposits, 
opening new mines, and exploring for offshore gas requires 
knowledge and equipment not available in China. The needs 
cover a very broad spectrum, from heavy-duty trucks for use in 
open-pit mines to the computer hardware and software for proc-
essing seismic data. Moreover, to make effective use of many 
items requires simultaneous acquisition and absorption of many 
others. Almost without exception, the technologies and equip-
ment needed are expensive. 
In the giddy days immediately after Mao's death, officials 
greatly overestimated China's ability to purchase and absorb the 
new technologies. They wrongly expected to pay for imported 
technologies with the income from oil exports. They did not 
count on the constraints imposed by the type of technical training 
pursued prior to 1966 and by the calamitous effects of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976). China simply does not have enough 
skilled managers, engineers, technicians or specialized workers 
to master numerous new technologies simultaneously. Even with 
concerted effort it will take years, perhaps decades, to create the 
critical mass of skilled people needed to attain China's develop-
mental goals. True in a general sense, these twin miscalculations 
were—and are—particularly crucial in the energy sector. 
Politics 
Tapping China's energy resources is complicated by both 
domestic and international politics. On the domestic side, one 
finds the same types of regional, bureaucratic, and personal 
rivalries that bedevil other political systems. Various agencies, 
interests, and coalitions jostle one another at the budgetary trough 
and compete for other limited resources. Despite rhetorical 
homage to "scientific socialism," most decisions are made using 
political as well as purely technical or economic criteria. Thus, 
investment must be spread to satisfy many claimants rather than 
concentrated in an economically optimal way. Short-term de-
mands often overwhelm arguments in favor of technical solutions 
that might be better in the long run. In short, energy decisions in 
China are at least as political as they are in the United States. But 
the impact of confused and contradictory energy policies is worse 
in China than in the US because China lacks the moderating effect 
of myriad private sector decisions. 
International politics, or, more specifically, domestic debates 
over China's foreign policy and the way those debates are shaped 
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by external developments, also affect China's ability to develop 
its energy resources. The logistical, historical and technical 
factors outlined above make it imperative for China to rely, at 
least in part, on foreign assistance if it is to meet its energy 
requirements. But such reliance is an anathema to some officials 
and unpalatable to many others. They recall the history of 
"exploitation" at the hands of imperialist states and foreign 
companies. As nationalistic leaders dedicated to restoring 
China's prestige and independence, they view the role of transna-
tional energy companies through ideologically tinted glasses. 
They are understandably reluctant to allow foreigners to play a 
direct and central role in the development of so critical a sector as 
energy. Part of the attractiveness of the 1977-78 strategy of 
development was that it promised to keep the foreigners at arm's 
length; they would merely supply equipment and advice. 
As officials came to realize that exploiting China's energy 
resources—and attaining broader developmental goals—would be 
impossible without substantial foreign involvement, they faced 
two unpalatable alternatives: (1) the undermining of political 
legitimacy through failure to produce immediate and tangible 
economic benefit, or (2) dependence on foreign firms and govern-
ments. One reason it has taken China so long to conclude the first 
sizable contracts for development of coal and offshore oil is that 
officials are unwilling to make politically risky decisions. They 
fear, with good reason, that support for foreign involvement (that 
is, "underestimating China's potential" and "selling out to the 
capitalists") might come back to haunt them. 
Involving foreigners effectively and absorbing advanced tech-
nologies raise other political issues as well. Current efforts to 
"readjust and reform" the economy are linked to the effort to 
achieve greater energy (as well as economic) efficiency and they 
tread on deeply entrenched interests. Aggrieved or endangered 
interests (e.g., inefficient factories, and local Party leaders in 
relatively disadvantaged areas) mobilize support and use every 
available political tool to alter decisions they do not like. This has 
had, and will continue to have, a major impact on the implemen-
tation of energy policy. 
CURRENT POLICIES AND PRIORITIES 
Confronted with this complex mixture of opportunities and 
difficulties, China's leaders have moved, albeit by fits and starts 
and with a degree of trial and error, to formulate integrated, 
comprehensive, and effective energy policies for the entire na-
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tion. After decades of neglect, the energy sector has been ac-
corded high, if not highest, priority. Although the military still 
commands the lion's share of the budget and agriculture retains 
rhetorical preeminence, investment in energy production and 
distribution is at an all-time high, and energy considerations are 
central to the evaluation of all capital construction projects. 
Implementation has lagged behind the articulation of energy 
policies and, naturally, individuals and organizations have inter-
preted guidelines to accord with their own wishes. However, 
generally speaking, China appears to be moving in a sensible 
direction. Cataloging the dozens of specific measures adopted is 
less useful than describing the four fundamental elements of 
Chinese energy policy: conservation, concentration, cooperation, 
and coordination. 
Conservation of Existing Resources 
Chinese fondness for the slogan of "walking on two legs" has 
continued into the post-Mao era. Under that rubric officials now 
proclaim the need to pursue both exploitation (i.e., greater 
production) and conservation of energy. They immediately add, 
however, that production cannot be increased significantly in the 
short term and that primary emphasis must be placed on conser-
vation through more efficient use of the energy that is produced. 
Official pessimism about the ability of China to produce more 
energy has been justified by recent statistics showing little or no 
growth. Even allowing for the inaccuracies that almost certainly 
exist in Chinese statistics, the trend is clear and stands in sharp 
contrast to that of the early 1970s, as is shown by Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
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SOURCE: Chinese government reports and United Nations statistics 
Reference to energy shortages began to appear in China's 
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media in early 1977, but officials and commentators did not 
highlight their magnitude or seriousness until 1979. The follow-
ing excerpt is typical of many articles and speeches published in 
the past three years: 
China possesses extremely abundant energy sources, but 
there are serious problems in the field of energy supply. 
Due to shortages of fuel and electric power, many enter-
prises are unable to operate at full capacity. This affects the 
speed of development of the national economy. It is not 
possible to fully meet the fuel and power needs of the 
people in urban and rural areas. This affects normal life. 
The energy problem is therefore a problem which we must 
take urgent steps to solve. 
Officials signalled the importance they assigned to alleviating 
the consequences of energy shortfalls through conservation meas-
ures by proclaiming November 1979 the "first nationwide energy 
conservation month." To launch the campaign to conserve en-
ergy, Kang Shi'en, then minister of the State Economic Commis-
sion, outlined the magnitude of the problem and identified the 
areas of greatest concern. Even allowing for the hyperbole and use 
of extreme examples common to such PRC statements, the follow-
ing passage provides useful insight into the thinking of senior 
officials. 
Why do we particularly stress energy conservation at 
present? As everyone knows, due to interference and 
sabotage by Lin Biao and the gang of four, the management 
of energy is now in a state of confusion, the effective energy 
utilization rate is very low, and wasteful losses of coal, 
petroleum, and electricity are frightening. China now 
consumes forty-to-fifty million tons more coal, three-to-
four million tons more oil, and twenty-to-thirty billion 
kilowatts more electricity than is necessary each year. This 
waste is even more shocking when compared with the 
effective energy utilization rate in advanced foreign coun-
tries. In China the effective utilization rate of thermal 
energy derived from fuel is only about 28 percent, while in 
the developed countries it has reached around 50 percent, 
almost double ours. . . . We are consuming too much 
petroleum and not conserving our natural resources in a 
rational way. Various enterprises on the industrial and 
communications front are now consuming over thirty mil-
lion tons of oil. Over ten million tons of this petroleum are 
consumed directly. Most of the direct consumption of oil 
may be eliminated through using coal. If we can save over 
ten million tons of petroleum for export, we can earn more 
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than two billion US dollars in foreign exchange a year. We 
really cannot afford the consumption of oil in this manner. 
To implement the call for energy conservation, departments 
and localities were instructed to prepare concrete plans to reduce 
wasteful consumption. Enterprises must monitor the amount of 
fuel and power used and strive to reduce consumption per unit of 
output. Inefficient factories will be penalized, presumably by 
having their allocations of energy reduced, and those able to use 
energy most efficiently will be given additional supplies if the 
addition will enable them to operate at higher capacity. This is in 
keeping with a general shift to what are termed "economic 
methods." Other conservation measures include retrofitting 
plants as part of the emphasis on tapping the full potential of 
existing enterprises, the introduction of "modern" principles of 
management and techniques associated with systems engineering 
and operations research, and closer monitoring of energy con-
sumption. 
To conserve oil, oil-burning industrial boilers are to be con-
verted to burn coal. Current policy specifies that "a l l " oil-fired 
boilers must be converted and no new ones may be constructed 
except in extraordinary cases. Reasons for making such a change 
include freeing more oil for export and other forms of domestic 
consumption, and taking full advantage of China's large coal 
reserves. But there are also costs and problems associated with 
this policy. For example, increased use of coal will require 
additional transport capacity, opening and/or expanding mines, 
and greater attention to pollution problems—not to mention the 
direct costs of conversion. Thus far, officials seem to be paying 
little attention to these implications. 
Concentration of Investment 
Another Maoist aphorism adopted by his successors is to 
"concentrate resources to fight a war of annihilation." This 
injunction has been construed to mean that available resources 
(human, fiscal, technical, etc.) must be dedicated to the construc-
tion of a relatively small number of projects that can be completed 
quickly and will produce tangible and immediately benefits. 
Applied to energy decisions, this approach has produced three 
notable developments. 
The first and most significant development is increased invest-
ment in the energy sector. Despite substantial reduction in 
expenditures for capital construction, the amount and percentage 
of funds earmarked for energy production (and conservation) 
have climbed to an all-time high. Having identified energy 
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shortfalls as the principal obstacle to realization of economic, 
social, and political goals, officials have made the politically 
difficult decision to shift resources from other sectors with 
aspirations, requirements, and supporters of their own. 
Resources have been concentrated more heavily than here-
tofore in the energy sector; within that sector, they have been 
concentrated in relatively few facilities. In order to bring new 
facilities on line as quickly as possible, the number of concurrent 
projects has been reduced sharply in the past three years. More 
care than previously is being devoted to the evaluation of alterna-
tive projects to ascertain the optimal sequence of development. 
Existing facilities will be expanded and modernized before new 
ones are built if doing so will produce better results in the short 
run. 
Principles and priorities guiding the retrofitting of existing 
facilities to conserve energy are similar to those guiding new 
construction. Since industry consumes more than 70 percent of 
all commecial energy in China, and since the chemical, petro-
chemical, and metallurgical industries account for most of that 
figure, initial efforts are directed at the biggest sources of waste in 
these major consuming industries. This approach has certain 
clear advantages but it is also quite new in China where it has 
been far more common to dissipate resources in order to "do a 
little for everyone at the same t ime." 
Second, the general economic policy of "readjustment" serves 
to concentrate investment in ways that affect the energy sector. A 
key component of that approach has been to shift resources and 
emphasis from heavy to light industry. One frequently pro-
claimed reason for doing so is that light and textile industries 
consume far less energy per unit of production than do heavy 
industries. Reducing the targets and operating time of one heavy 
industrial facility "frees u p " enough fuel and power to supply 
several light industrial plants. The latter generate higher profits, 
produce goods needed to satisfy rising consumer demand at 
home, and earn foreign exchange from exports. 
Concentrating resources in this way has raised the productiv-
ity of energy inputs, but it has also infringed upon the interests of 
powerful groups. These include representatives of the defense 
industries and their allies in the military, centers of heavy 
industry such as Shenyang and Anshan, and officials linked by 
factional ties and logrolling arrangements. These political 
forces—Nikita Khrushchev used to refer to their Soviet counter-
parts as "steel eaters"—will no doubt make new claims on the 
country's fuel and power in the near future. 
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Finally, the energy supplies produced under central direction 
will be consumed primarily in the cities. Since total energy 
production will grow slowly and demand in the urban and 
industrial sector will steadily increase, the supply of commercial 
energy to the rural areas will not increase significantly during the 
remainder of the decade. Consequently, the ambitious plan to 
mechanize agriculture by 1985 has been abandoned. Even if there 
were no other obstacles (which of course there are), the energy 
requirements (diesel fuel, electricity, gasoline) would be prohib-
itive. 
There is a sense in which the 800 million people living in the 
countryside are being told that they must once again defer to the 
needs of their urban cousins, but there are significant differences 
between present policies and past neglect of the rural areas. For 
the first time in PRC history, the central government appears to be 
making a substantial effort to help the villages to help themselves 
in the energy field. 
As part of this effort, investigation teams have surveyed the 
potential energy resources, capabilities, and needs of all (approx-
imately 2,000) rural counties to determine, among other things, 
the potential for development of small hydrogenerators, local coal 
pits, biogas, solar energy, and fuelwood. Recognizing the impos-
sibility of formulating detailed plans for 2,000 counties, the 
Energy Research Institute (subordinate to both the State Economic 
Commission and the Chinese Academy of Sciences) has assigned 
each county to one of twenty-six categories or "zones ." Counties 
in the same zone have the same general mix of resources and 
requirements. When the process of analysis and clarification has 
been completed, central officials will formulate twenty-six rather 
than 2,000 specific rural energy policies. Small hydro projects 
will be encouraged in some counties, for example, while tapping 
natural gas deposits will be promoted in others. The allocation of 
funds, assignment of skilled personnel, and development of local 
industries will be made accordingly. 
Cooperation: Foreign and Domestic 
After years of delay and agonizing efforts to find an acceptable 
alternative, China's leaders have finally begun to sign major 
contracts with foreign firms for the development of energy 
resources. At the same time, the government is encouraging 
cooperation across formerly hermetic administrative boundaries 
within China. Both forms of collaboration have encountered 
political resistance. 
Domestic opposition to foreign involvement is fueled by 
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economic concerns as well as chauvinism. Investment in the 
development of energy resources is, to some extent, a zero-sum 
game. Some regions, industries, and enterprises will benefit from 
joint projects with foreign partners while others will be disadvan-
taged, at least in the short run. Those with something to lose have 
joined those opposed to foreign involvement on ideological or 
xenophobic grounds. Politics is omnipresent. By mid-1982, how-
ever, Deng Xiaoping and his allies had converted, neutralized, or 
removed enough of those opposed to foreign involvement to clear 
away the remaining obstacles. 
Willingness to permit major energy companies and foreign 
governments to participate in the search for and exploitation of 
China's energy resources is neither a sudden development nor an 
invitation to foreigners to write their own ticket. While combating 
and conquering domestic opposition, key officials (e.g., Deng, 
Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and Yao Yilin) and legal, technical, 
financial, and other specialists have been preparing the way for 
restricted but effective foreign investment in the energy sector. 
Preparation of the joint venture, corporate income tax, petroleum, 
and other laws; decisions as to how and where foreigners will be 
allowed to invest; and analysis of how to reap maximum benefits 
from training, technical information, and sale of equipment and 
support services has proceeded slowly but steadily during the 
past three years. Hence, when it became politically possible to 
invite the foreigners in, it was also technically possible to do so. 
These developments are not unrelated; it is likely that political 
opposition diminished as safeguards were devised. 
Cooperation within the country is at least as significant and as 
fraught with political controversy as allowing foreigners to invest 
in and operate mines and oilfields. The government is promoting 
a variety of new (for China) ways to induce joint projects between, 
and capture scarce investment funds from, different amdinistra-
tive and functional units. For example, provinces with limited or 
low-quality deposits of coal have been urged and enabled to 
invest in the development of mines located in other provinces. 
They do so with the promise of reaping economic benefits (e.g., 
equipment sales and a return on investment) and guaranteed 
energy supplies. At lower levels of the system, new ways are 
being tested to facilitate cooperation among villages (teams, 
brigades, and even communes) in the same river basin or astride 
the same deposit of coal. 
As reasonable as it seems, the policy of encouraging domestic 
cooperation faces several obstacles. For years, farms, factories, 
and administrative units were urged to be self-reliant: their 
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willingness to be so was reinforced by traditional rivalries and the 
perils of depending on others. As a result, cooperation was 
problematic and infrequent. Better guidance, better leadership, 
and material incentives are now seen as critical to overcoming the 
attitudes and behavior of the past. It is too soon to declare current 
policies a success, but, again, they are a step in the right 
direction. 
Improved Coordination of Policy Implementation 
To formulate and monitor their new energy policy, PRC 
leaders decided in 1979 that China needed a new superministerial 
body. By the time the establishment of the State Energy Commis-
sion was formally announced in May 1980 it had existed for at 
least six and possibly ten months. The new commission was 
headed by Yu Qiuli, vice-premier and former head of the State 
Planning Commission, who had acquired fame and influence as 
the military commander in charge of opening the Daqing oilfield. 
Ironically, however, the Energy Commission was created at a 
time when Yu's approach to energy development (which under-
lay the developmental plan announced in early 1978) had been 
discredited and largely abandoned. The Energy Commission 
failed to achieve the desired results, in part, because Yu did not 
share the goals and assumptions of the leaders who demoted him 
to his new position, and because his nominal leadership of the 
commission undermined its authority and effectiveness. 
But that is a separate story. The important point here is that 
China's leaders saw the need to achieve greater coordination 
among energy ministries (petroleum, coal, and electric power) 
and to focus attention on the energy implications of the plans and 
practices of all other ministries and subnational administrative 
jurisdictions. They also sought to overcome paralyzing political 
maneuvers by creating a new organization with clearer authority 
and fewer parochial interests; in fact, they succeeded merely in 
changing the focus of debate on energy issues. 
Even though the Energy Commission was abolished in May 
1982, the priority given to coordination has persisted. For exam-
ple, one of its subordinate units, the Energy Research Institute 
(now subsumed under the State Economic Commission and the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences) was assigned the task of reviewing 
the energy impact of all capital construction proposals submitted 
to the State Planning Commission. Its analysis was supposed to 
eliminate projects which could not be supplied with adequate 
fuel and power without depriving other consumers or requiring 
ancillary investment in new generating capacity, pipelines, etc. 
56 
Overall responsibility for formulating the energy sector plans 
and coordinating projects to ensure adequate supplies of fuel and 
power now rests with the State Planning Commission and the 
State Economic Commission. The evidence to date suggests that 
considerable progress has been made toward overcoming energy 
bottlenecks caused by unplanned or poorly coordinated construc-
tion and operation of industrial enterprises. Better coordination 
has also been achieved through the remerging of the former 
ministries of water conservancy and electric power (both of which 
had constructed hydro facilities). The major restructuring of state 
agencies undertaken in the spring of 1982 also should enhance 
coordination of energy policy. With fewer organizations, fewer 
layers of bureaucracy, and fewer redundant functionaries, project 
review and approval procedures will be simplified and, it is 
hoped, lead to greater efficiency. 
The tenor of economic policy in general facilitates coordina-
tion in energy development. Provincial, municipal and enterprise 
officials are on a shorter leash when it comes to beginning new 
projects. As a result, there has been a sharp reduction in the 
amount of new construction, which, in turn, has slowed growth 
of energy demand. 
Several additional steps have been adopted to enhance coordi-
nation. Provincial governments and Party committees have been 
instructed to establish special groups to oversee energy-related 
matters and to assign clear responsibility for the implementation 
of energy policies. Regulatory mechanisms are henceforth to be 
supplemented by a type of outside review effected through the 
various branches and arms of the People's Bank. More investment 
capital is to be allocated through loans approved and monitored 
by agencies of the Bank than through direct grants from central 
ministries. Before approving any loan, Bank cadres are supposed 
to review projects to ensure that requisite supplies of fuel and 
power will be available. There are reasons to question the ability 
of Bank personnel to conduct thorough reviews of all projects, but 
this is another step in the right direction. 
Coordination does not just mean centralization, however. 
Indeed, separate corporations more independent of central minis-
terial control have been established to perform specific functions. 
Some of these corporations have entered into joint ventures with 
foreign firms; the China National Offshore Oil Corporation is an 
obvious example. Moreover, even as the government has tight-
ened planning and control over critical sectors of the economy, it 
has allowed market mechanisms to operate more freely in second-
ary areas. This should lead to better energy planning and policies 
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by enabling the small band of overworked statisticians, analysts, 
and planners to focus on fewer projects and relationships. 
PROSPECTS 
China's leaders have undertaken nothing less than the total 
restructuring of their economic system. Energy plays a key role in 
their approach and success or failure in the energy sector will 
strongly influence, perhaps even determine, the outcome of the 
broader effort. What are the prospects of success on the energy 
front? What are the implications for the United States? 
If left in place long enough, the general approach and specific 
policies concerning energy now dominant in China could, per-
haps will, produce the desired results. On balance, the policies 
are both appropriate and sound; the unaddressed and unanswera-
ble question is whether or not they will produce enough tangible 
benefits fast enough to satisfy skeptics, opponents, the public as a 
whole, or even key supporters. 
If one were to predict the future on the basis of China's recent 
past, the inescapable conclusion is that prospects for policy 
continuity are not very good. Leaders and constituents eager for 
dramatic advances have repeatedly demonstrated impatience 
with policies that ' 'worked" but were too slow. Given the 
visibility and inherently political character of current economic 
policies, including those dealing specifically with energy, it 
seems certain that those who fare relatively badly under policies 
now in place will do what they can to force change. Rising 
expectations among the leadership as well as the rural and urban 
populace will inevitably lead to increased demands and reduced 
willingness to delay gratification in the name of abstract goals or 
the larger good. These pressures will be aggravated by demogra-
phy and disenchantment with Marxism, the Communist Party, 
and contemporary Chinese society. Cynicism and the implicit 
question, "What has the Party done for me lately?" undermine 
the authority of the regime and individual leaders. To restore lost 
legitimacy, current policies must succeed. If success comes too 
slowly, current leaders may be tempted to experiment with other 
alternatives in an effort to substitute motion for movement and to 
buy more time for themselves. 
Though possible, the above scenario is probably less likely 
than one of basic policy stability with continuous adjustments at 
the margins, and with intermittent removal of scapegoats who can 
be blamed if policies fail to deliver as much or as quickly as 
people have been led to expect. Perhaps the strongest reasons for 
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assuming such continuity are that the approach is unlikely to fail 
miserably and that there are no ready alternatives. Weary of 
unsuccessful experimentation and eager for sustained, predict-
able, and "sensible" policies, a significant portion of the public is 
likely to support continuity and to "give the leaders and their 
approach more t ime." As long as things do not get worse, they 
need not improve dramatically to satisfy "the masses." Iron-
ically, greater participation in the world economy and a larger 
role for transnational and foreign government-owned energy 
companies will increase pressures favoring preservation of the 
status quo. 
Without substantial policy stability, China will not be able to 
exploit its rich energy resources fast enough to satisfy growing 
domestic demand or to provide revenue-generating exports to 
finance imports of grain, equipment, and technologies needed to 
prevent slipping even further behind the advanced and rapidly 
modernizing states with which China wants to be compared. 
China's energy balance will not improve significantly during 
the 1980s. Projects initiated in 1982-83 will not come on line until 
the latter part of the decade; when they do, output will barely 
meet increased domestic demand. Even if offshore deposits prove 
as rich as many hope, China probably will not earn much 
additional foreign exchange until well into the 1990s because it 
will need to retain its share of the output for domestic use. It is 
possible, especially if efforts to locate oil offshore prove unsuc-
cessful, that China might have to import small quantities of oil 
during the 1980s. 
For many reasons, the United States and American corpora-
tions will play a central role in the development of China's energy 
resources. Many technologies and much of the capital needed to 
locate and exploit deposits of oil, coal, and natural gas must come 
from the United States. For better or worse, China is going to 
become more dependent on US firms and its political relations 
with the United States will become hostage, up to a point, to these 
economic and energy relationships. Similarly, the US govern-
ment can be uniquely helpful in the development of China's 
hydroelectric potential. The government-to-government agree-
ment for cooperation in hydroelectric power and related water 
resources and its annexes could be extremely helpful to the 
Chinese and very profitable for American firms. 
Should relations between Washington and Peking deteriorate 
significantly at some future point, it is unlikely that American 
firms would undertake new energy development projects. De-
pending on the outcome of President Reagan's attempt to block 
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the sale of equipment embodying US technologies to the Soviet 
Union for use in constructing the natural gas pipeline to Western 
Europe, American firms may find it undesirable to operate in 
China and China might treat American firms as suppliers of last 
resort. 
While it is true that deterioration of official relations between 
China and the United States could, probably would, interfere 
with the development of China's energy resources and realization 
of its broader economic, social, and political goals, both sides 
recognize how undesirable that would be. At some point which is 
likely to be reached relatively quickly, increased energy ties will 
strengthen and add to the stability of the political relationship. 
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THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN U.S.-CHINA 
RELATIONS 
Richard P. Suttmeier 
In ways that are rather unique among nations, science and 
technology (S&T) have played an unusually important role in the 
recent history of U.S.-China relations. It is also the case that US-
PRC relations in S&T stand out in the wider context of efforts by 
the United States to use S&T as instruments of foreign policy. In 
my discussion here I will attempt to address both of these 
dimensions of the topic. That is, I want to take as our first point of 
reference U.S.-China relations generally, regarding S&T relations 
as a subset of these; and to take as our second point of reference 
the general phenomenon of international S&T relations, regarding 
the U.S.-China relationship as a subset here as well. I will attempt 
to make the case that the significance of our subject is found in 
both interpretations. 
U.S.-China Relations and S&T 
At the outset we should note that international S&T relations 
are conducted in three main modes. The first is what we can call 
the private, professional mode, which is founded on the principle 
of universalism in science, and the international behavioral 
consequences that flow from its observance. In the US-PRC case, 
we can identify a variety of interactions that would fall under this 
category. These include the exchange of scientists and students 
through non-governmental channels (which probably accounts 
for about half of the 10,000 Chinese students estimated to be in 
the US at this time), university to university relations, relations 
between professional societies, and relationships that are main-
tained by individual scholars. 
A second mode is the commercial, one that normally but not 
exclusively pertains to technology more than to science. There 
have been a variety of technology transfer schemes worked out 
between the two sides. The Chinese seemingly would like to get 
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more out of these relationships, and some American parties may 
also like to see these develop along a broader front with oppor-
tunities for more free wheeling exchanges. However, this mode 
has been somewhat restricted by American export control pol-
itices, as we shall see below. 
It is worthy of note that these first two modes both mainly 
involve the private sector in the US, where a greal deal of our 
nation's S&T is to be found. At the same time, the private sector is 
much more difficult to mobilize in the interest of supporting 
directly the foreign policy goals of the government. The third, 
and somewhat less publicly recognized mode, however, is so 
mobilizable. This third mode is the intergovernmental. It is 
characterized by the facts that S&T activities are in some way 
sponsored by governments for both scientific and technological 
and foreign policy purposes, and that government agencies and 
government scientists are the key actors. In addition, when 
dealing with a country like China, the intergovernmental mode 
can be thought of as providing a politically based framework for 
the other two. 
US intergovernmental S&T relations with China, in compari-
son with those maintained with other countries, are now by far 
the most extensive. These activities are conducted under an 
umbrella US-PRC Agreement for Cooperation in S&T, and a series 
of protocols to that agreement signed by US departments and 
agencies and PRC ministries, academies and commissions. There 
are now seventeen of these protocols in the following areas: 
PROTOCOLS UNDER THE US-PRC SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT 
1. Understanding on the Exchange of Students and Scholars. 
Agreed to October 1978. 
2. Understanding on Agriculture Exchanges. Agreed to Novem-
ber 1978. US Department of Agriculture's Office of Interna-
tional Cooperation and Development (OICD)/China State 
Agricultural Commission. (With the reorganization of Chi-
nese government ministries in May 1982, the State Agri-
cultural Commission was abolished and its responsibilities 
were handed over to the newly created Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Animal Husbandry and Fishery.) 
3. Understanding on Cooperation in Space Technology. Agreed 
to December 1978. National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration/Chinese Academy of Space Technology and Chinese 
Academy of Sciences. (These first three agreements were 
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made before the establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween the US and China and prior to the signing of the US-
PRC Science and Technology Agreement on January 31, 1979. 
All three were subsequently subsumed under the umbrella of 
the science and technology accord.) 
4. High Energy Physics. US Department of Energy/China State 
Scientific and Technological Commission (SSTC). Signed 
January 31, 1979. 
5. Management of Science and Technology Information. US 
Department of Commerce/SSTC. Signed May 8, 1979. 
6. Meteorology and Standards. US Department of Commerce/ 
China State Bureau of Meteorology. Signed May 8, 1979. 
7. Atmospheric Science and Technology. National Oceanic and 
Aeronautical Administration (NOAA)/China Central Mete-
orological Bureau (now the State Meteorological Administra-
tion). Signed May 8, 1979. 
8. Marine and Fishery Science and Technology. NOAA/China 
National Bureau of Oceanography. Signed May 8, 1979. 
9. Medicine and Public Health. US Department of Health and 
Human Services/Chinese Ministry of Public Health. Signed 
June 22, 1979. 
10. Hydroelectric Power and Related Water Services. US Depart-
ment of Commerce/Chinese Ministry of Power Industry. 
Signed August 28, 1979, by Walter Mondale and Deng 
Xiaoping. 
11. Earthquake Studies. National Science Foundation and US 
Geological Survey, Department of Interior/Chinese State Seis-
mological Bureau. Signed January 24, 1980. 
12. Earth Sciences. US Geological Survey/Chinese Academy of 
Geological Sciences, Ministry of Geology. Signed January 24, 
1980. 
13. Environmental Protection. US Environmental Protection 
Agency/Office of the Environmental Protection Leading 
Group of the State Council. Signed February 5, 1980. 
14. Basic Sciences. National Science Foundation/Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 
Signed December 10, 1980. 
15. Building Construction and Urban Planning Science Technol-
ogy. US Department of Housing and Urban Development/ 
Chinese State Capital Construction Commission. Signed Oc-
tober 17, 1981. 
16. Nuclear Safety. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission/SSTC. 
Signed October 17, 1981. 
17. Surface Water Hydrology. US Geological Survey/Bureau of 
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Hydrology, Chinese Ministry of Water Conservancy. Signed 
October 17, 1981. (In May 1982 the Ministry of Water Conser-
vancy together with the Ministry of Power Industry was 
merged into the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power.) 
In addition, four new agreements are expected to be signed in 
May at the third annual meeting of the US-PRC S&T Joint 
Commission, the body which oversees the implementation of the 
umbrella Agreement. These are in the areas of aeronautical 
science, transportation, nuclear physics and magnetic fusion, and 
basic medical sciences. (These were in fact signed in Beijing in 
mid-May 1983 by George Keyworth, Presidential Science Ad-
visor, and Fang Yi, Chairman of China's Commission on Science 
and Technology—Editor's note). 
To get a better sense of the nature of the S&T relationship, let 
us consider briefly its history. It is helpful to recall that a 
recurrent theme of modern Chinese history since the middle of 
the 19th century has been China's attempt to ' 'modernize" 
through the employment of modern science and technology. 
Because these efforts at adopting, and adapting to, Western 
material and intellectual culture often spilled over into the 
mainstream of Chinese politics, they were often disruptive. But 
these confrontations with Western culture prior to 1949 did 
involve diverse forms of what we would now call S&T relations. 
Thus, one way of looking at the growth of U.S. S&T relations with 
China during the last dozen years or so would be as a continuation 
of a century-long, and often highly problematic, Chinese effort to 
use S&T in modernization. 
In the more recent period of the history of Sino-American 
relations, the distinctive role of S&T comes into sharper relief. In 
the period between the signing of the Shanghai Communique in 
1972 and the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1979, 
S&T relations with China played an especially important role in 
moving the two nations toward normalization. Although S&T 
relations did not, nor could they, substitute for political under-
standings, the organized and unorganized exchanges of technical 
personnel between the two countries which began in 1972 were 
politically significant in contributing to a clarification of each 
nation's interests. In addition, the prenormalization exchanges 
have proven to be important to the relative success of cooperation 
under the terms of the S&T Agreement since its signing in 1979. 
The opportunity for the United States more aggressively to use 
S&T as an instrument of China policy came in 1978. China 
announced earlier in that year an ambitious new modernization 
drive, and identified S&T development as the key to the moderni-
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zation of agriculture, industry, and national defense. In March, 
the details of an equally ambitious S&T development plan were 
announced, including a list of research and development (R&D) 
priorities. The priorities were in areas where U.S. science had 
much to offer. A rather obvious supply-and-demand situation had 
emerged; the challenge was to make a match. 
The first major step toward this end came in May, 1978, with 
national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's visit to China. At 
that time, efforts were made by U.S. officials to explore with 
Chinese counterparts the possibilities of expanded S&T coopera-
tion even without normalized diplomatic relations. The Chinese 
signaled they were ready to move. In July the Unietd States sent a 
high-level delegation of government science administrators, led 
by Presidential Science Advisor Frank Press, to further the 
process. Growing out of this mission were agreements signed in 
the fall of 1978 for exchanges of students and scholars, and for 
cooperation in space and in agriculture. These were all subsumed 
under the umbrella S&T Agreement when it was signed in 
January, 1979. 
The seizing of the opportunity to use S&T in relations with 
China was not simply a matter of matching Chinese "demands" 
with U.S. "suppl ies ." Officials in the Carter Administration were 
prompted by at least three other considerations. The first was 
long-term global economic concerns while the second was part of 
the strategy for building a US-PRC political relationship. The 
former was mainly a U.S. concern for long-term world food and 
energy supply issues. Simply put, the food and energy demands 
of a modernizing China were expected to be enormous. The more 
China relied on international markets for these goods, the more 
strain would be put on world supplies. Since it was assumed that 
international instability caused by food and energy shortages was 
not in the U.S. interest, the U.S. should help China develop its 
capabilities to meet indigenously as much of its food and energy 
needs as possible. S&T cooperation, it was thought, would be 
instrumental for this objective. 
The second consideration was part of the Administration's 
efforts to forge closer Sino-American relations in the interest of 
increasing U.S. leverage in its dealings with the Soviet Union. 
This objective, at a minimum, required relations with China that 
would be stable and capable of sustaining understandings on a 
range of issues of strategic importance. Administration officials 
believed that through S&T relations a constituency sympathetic to 
the United States could be cultivated in China. Also, US-PRC 
relations could be put on firmer ground if a wide range of 
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"transnational" relations could be established. The first belief 
resulted from a perception that the Chinese elite was in the 
process of transformation (on the bases of both post-Mao/post-
Gang of Four changes and generational change), and that a 
successor generation was likely to be considerably more tech-
nocratic in its orientation. Such an elite, it was thought, would be 
sensitive to what U.S. S&T had to offer China, and thus it would 
be in its interest to try and maintain close relations with the 
United States. The second belief held that a wide range of 
nongovernmental relations with China would create constituen-
cies on both sides that would work to maintain and strengthen the 
political relationship. The Administration therefore set out to 
encourage a " w e b " of commercial and "people to people" 
relationships of which S&T exchanges would be perhaps the most 
important part. 
What is less clear is the stock that Carter administration 
officials put in S&T relations as a lever for moving China away 
from strongly held political values. In particular, it is unclear how 
strongly, if at all, officials believed that scientific cooperation and 
liberalized technology transfer would strengthen the U.S. hand in 
dealing with the Taiwan question. Reviewing that period, it 
seems that S&T was not expected to carry Sino-American rela-
tions through difficulties in which there would be a major 
political impasse. 
A final objective discernible in the U.S. effort to foster an S&T 
relationship with China was related to trade promotion. Although 
it is difficult to find any well articulated doctrine explaining how 
this was to be done, and there is not much evidence that a 
coherent strategy of implementation was ever put in place, there 
was a belief that S&T exchange would contribute to facilitating 
trade. 
When the Reagan Administration took office, there were 
reasons to doubt whether the momentum for S&T cooperation 
would last. First, Reagan's position on Taiwan was likely to sour 
the political framework for S&T. Perhaps just as important, both 
the Chinese and American governments were instituting stringent 
budget policies, and under such conditions, international S&T 
normally would not figure high on the list of anyone's priorities. 
What became evident after a few months, however, was that both 
sides were making significant efforts to protect S&T funding from 
the onslaughts of their respective budget cutters. 
These developments would suggest that at least some interests 
on both sides were (and are) being served by the relationship, and 
that S&T can have a cohesive influence on political relations that 
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become frayed. This is not to say, however, that the S&T relation-
ship is without problems. Funding continues to place a limit on 
how much can be done. Finding a basis for true reciprocity is 
another. More importantly, given what appears to be a wide-
spread belief that reciprocity is impossible to achieve and that the 
Chinese benefit more than we, there appears to be a belief on the 
American side that the S&T relationship can do more than it was 
intended to do. That is, that it can be used as leverage on such 
volatile political issues as Taiwan. While a degree of leverage 
probably does exist, it would be a sad mistake to overestimate it, 
as some who are not familiar with China's modern history are 
prone to do. 
On a day-to-day basis the most intractable problem is that of 
controls over the export of advanced technology to China. The 
problem here is for the U.S. effectively to link declarative policy 
with "policy" as understood as the outcome of implementation 
processes. Under the Carter Administration, the political leader-
ship took what were regarded as the necessary steps to resolve the 
export control problem. China was decoupled from policy toward 
the Soviet bloc, and placed in its own policy category, "category 
P." According to this designation, only technologies of strategic 
significance—nuclear weapons, delivery systems, anti-submarine 
warfare, electronic warfare, and intelligence technologies—are 
subject to controls. 
Difficulties arise however when lower level officials are ex-
pected to implement this policy with regard to "dual use" items, 
such as advanced computers, and ones that will contribute 
directly to the development of China's "infrastructure" for pro-
ducing the proscribed technologies. The record to date has been 
one that has created the impression among the Chinese that the 
U.S. in fact has a policy of denial of export requests. The 
impression is not without foundation since U.S. export control 
machinery operates in such a way that it is structurally biased 
against liberalization. 
A final issue facing the relationship is that of whether the U.S. 
should extend to China some form of concessionary aid. This 
question is related to the funding issue noted above. While most 
observers of US-PRC relations would consider it politically in-
feasible to mount a major foreign assistance program for China, a 
number of observers have noted that much more could be done to 
enhance the S&T relationship, in the interest of the political 
relationship, if modest concessionary financing were available. 
This is because US intergovernmental S&T programs, including 
the China program, are as a matter of policy conducted on a 
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"benefitting side pays" basis. When there is an obvious reciproc-
ity of benefits, the funding of the US participation is constrained 
only by the budget in force. However, when the benefits to the US 
are not evident, it is expected that the other side will pay. Since 
the Chinese are often unable or unwilling to pay, there is much 
that the US has to offer which would be helpful to China, and 
helpful to the political relationship, that cannot be made avail-
able. It is this situation that leads to the argument from some that 
modest amounts of aid should be provided. 
S&T and Foreign Policy 
As suggested above, the US-PRC relationship raises a number 
of other questions about the role of S&T in foreign affairs. It is an 
interesting case for study of how a country like the U.S. mobi-
lizes, or fails to mobilize, S&T resources to support foreign policy 
goals. We live in a world where S&T are highly valued, in large 
part because of the belief that present and future problems of 
human happiness and comfort cannot be solved without them. 
Presumably those possessing the valued goods, of whom the 
United States is still pre-eminent, can use them to influence 
others desiring access to them. Thus, the potential for leverage in 
international affairs exists. The realization of that potential is, 
however, by no means easy. 
In countries like the United States, where so much S&T is in 
the private sector, the problem of realizing the potential foreign 
policy benefits from S&T cooperation is particularly challenging. 
An examination of the US-PRC case indicates that the US side is 
rather poorly organized to perform this task, and to take full 
advantage of the opportunities that exist. While centralized 
direction of both the public and private sectors would not be 
consistent with our vlues and traditions, it is also the case that the 
foreign policy apparatus is rather poorly prepared to face the 
challenges and opportunities of an international environment in 
which S&T are highly valued goods. 
With this observation in mind let me conclude with a brief 
assessment of the achievements to date. In terms of political 
objectives, one must be modest in one's expectations. Both sides 
have begun to learn a great deal about each other, and it is clear 
that both sides now incorporate these lessons into their respective 
policy deliberations. A web of relationships has developed and 
the United States has been able to have access to an emerging, 
more technocratic elite. The long-term political benefits of this, 
however, are not clear and should not be overestimated. 
While many of the scientific benefits, particularly in the 
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exchanges of students and scholars, have gone to the Chinese, it 
would be a serious mistake if benefits to the US were not 
recognized. These are most evident in those protocols where there 
are the most activies: agriculture, earthquake predictions, ocean-
ography and atmospheric sciences, and medicine and public 
health. These of course are areas where unique features of the 
Chinese setting, to which foreign scientists were for a long time 
denied access, now have become very interesting and researcha-
ble phenomena. In addition, in a more diffuse sense, American 
scientists welcome the opportunities to interact with a scientific 
community with many exceptional minds, even if the perfor-
mance of the community as a whole is still not up to the world's 
leading standards. 
Perhaps the most conceptually challenging, yet most difficult 
question to assess is whether commercial interests are served by 
cooperative science programs. There is no way to know whether 
increased trade can be attributed to increased S&T exchanges. In 
some cases, particularly those pertaining to the supply of techni-
cal services, there have been allegations from the private sector 
that government cooperative programs in effect undermine com-
mercial ventures. Nevertheless, one can postulate a number of 
reasons why S&T exchanges should be expected to facilitate trade 
expansion. 
For instance, exchanges should provide more intimate knowl-
edge of market possibilities for both buyers and sellers. Chinese 
scientists working in the United States should be expected to 
develop a type of "product loyalty" for the technology of research 
which could carry over to respect for the technology of produc-
tion as well. Of particular interest is whether close S&T coopera-
tion will produce commercial benefits to the United States now 
that substantial credits are available to China through interna-
tional lending agencies. 
Some have hoped that the existence of an S&T agreement 
would facilitate the export licensing process, although the basis 
of this belief is uncertain at best. In the longer run, of course, to 
the extent that S&T exchanges contribute to Chinese moderniza-
tion, one could expect that a more prosperous China would also 
be a larger market for American goods. The trade promotion 
potential of S&T agreements may not be realizable without 
concerted efforts to realize it, and with a few notable exceptions 
such as the Department of Agriculture, the record to date frankly 
does not reflect well on the US government's ability to coordinate 
effectively S&T relations, export promotion, and export controls. 
To the extent that a minimal objective of the S&T agreement 
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was to build bridges to China and begin to overcome 30 years of 
mutual ignorance and hostility, it is fair to conclude that it has 
been successful. I take as three important indications of this 
success that, first, consultations between participating agencies 
now occur frequently; that both sides now take into consideration 
the interests of the other in their own planning and that both sides 
have made notable efforts to protect program-related budgets in 
the face of general budgetary stringency; and that China now has 
an interest in continued cooperation with the United States. In 
addition, the United States has successfully made it known in 
ways it had not prior to the agreement that, like the Europeans 
and the Japanese, it has a stake in China's modernization and that 
it has much to offer. 
Whether the S&T agreement offers particular leverage in 
dealing with China on a range of "high politics" issues is, 
however, another matter. As noted above, S&T agreements, 
however much they can be supportive of political understand-
ings, are no substitute for the latter. Thus it seems unlikely that 
promises of S&T cooperation can be used to induce other nations 
to alter significant political positions. This is particularly so when 
the other nation, in this case China, has alternative partners for 
scientific cooperation and supplies of technology. Whatever the 
source, however, China's S&T relations are of interest finally in 
one additional sense. This is as a case (and given its history, a 
special one) of how a developing country absorbs not just foreign 
S&T, but more importantly how it responds to the cultures and 
institutions of nations considered to be "advanced" on the basis 
of their scientific and technological achievements. While the 
experience of the Soviet Union suggests that it would be illusory 
to believe that foreign S&T interactions necessarily become a force 
for domestic economic and political reform, it is also true that one 
cannot seriously discuss the extremely interesting reforms now 
going on in China without reference to the influences that 
intimate contacts with the West in the S&T area are having. 
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FINANCING THE FOUR 
MODERNIZATIONS: CHINA'S 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT NEEDS 




The postwar foreign economic policy of China has been 
characterized by dramatic shifts, reversals, and zigzags. Two 
major influences have been clashing: isolationism and self-
reliance vs. interdependence and pragmatism. 
Ideological extremism, bitter historical experience and na-
tional and regional pride are some of the forces that have pushed 
Chinese leaders to pursue, at one time or another, a policy of 
extreme isolationism and rejection of all foreign influence. Their 
bitter historical experience is especially important. From the 
mid-19th to the mid-20th century, China was repeatedly humili-
ated and dominated by foreign powers, depriving her by force of 
arms of valuable territory, tariff autonomy and customs control. 
After 1960, China's break with the USSR imposed very consider-
able economic hardship as the Russians withdrew their experts 
and technical aid and largely severed trade relations. The policy 
of isolationism was carried to extreme during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, 1966-1976. During much of that decade many enterprises 
virtually ceased operations, most universities and scientific estab-
lishments were closed, the legal system was abolished, and 
intellectuals and the professional staff of economic agencies were 
sent to the countryside and persecuted. The management of the 
economy was taken over by young and largely ignorant Red 
Guards and "revolutionary committees" advocating economic 
self-sufficiency at all levels. Except for the persecuted intellec-
tuals and professionals, everybody was to have the same low 
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income and minimum standard of living, regardless of ability, 
achievement, and effort. 
Although during the postwar period foreign trade had in-
creased—from very low levels—erratically in some years, the 
basic objective was to import only goods which could not be 
produced in China or which were needed to compensate for 
unforeseen domestic production shortfalls. Exports were given up 
reluctantly, to pay for imports. Commercial and financial inter-
course with the rest of the world was largely limited to simple 
''cash and carry" transactions. 
At the same time China always had leaders, sometimes si-
lenced, who were pragmatic in their thinking. They realized that 
cooperation with foreigners can help the country overcome its 
immense economic problems. Since the death of Mao Zedong in 
1976, many of these pragmatic leaders have been in charge of 
policy and have introduced fundamental changes in the domestic 
and foreign economic strategies of the country. The new leader-
ship has made some progress in reconstructing the educational, 
planning and statistical bureaucracies and has pursued policies to 
try to link economic achievement and reward, in some areas 
relying on the market mechanism in ways that only a few years 
ago would have been condemned as ' 'capitalist" and its advo-
cates jailed, even executed. The about face is especially notable in 
agriculture, where price incentives have been introduced and 
production responsibility again placed in the hands of families or 
small groups. Individual peasants now have the right to employ 
others and are told to enrich themselves; many have and are 
continuing successfully to do so. Small-scale private enterprise is 
also allowed; today there are 1.5 million licensed private ventures 
and much unlicensed private activity is tolerated also. 
Since the Cultural Revolution, China's leaders have also 
moved a remarkably long way toward greater participation in the 
world economy. Foreign commerce has increased considerably, 
and the ideological aversion to foreign borrowing has been 
muted. Trade with the U.S. has grown dramatically, especially 
after the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979. China has 
also joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank in 1980, significantly decentralized its foreign trade opera-
tions to promote direct foreign contacts at the enterprise level, 
welcomed partly or wholly foreign-owned direct investment, and 
established four special economic zones where Western firms can 
operate in an environment that in many ways is similar to that of a 
market economy. People to people contacts have also exploded, 
with nearly 10,000 Chinese students studying at American uni-
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versities alone and over 100,000 Americans visiting China each 
year as tourists or in professional capacities. 
These developments signal a basic change in the attitude of 
the current leadership regarding the role of international eco-
nomic and financial relations in the economy of China. Imports 
are viewed not simply as temporary expedients but as examples 
for domestic enterprises to follow. The role of exports is not just to 
finance essential imports but also to expose Chinese firms to 
foreign competition and to create new employment opportunities. 
Foreign direct investment is encouraged as a means of creating 
new jobs, obtaining additional scarce capital, and as a channel for 
absorbing foreign technology and management skills. 
China's new domestic and foreign policies are welcomed 
warmly by the U.S. and other Western countries because they 
move China further away from the USSR and create welcome 
business opportunities. At the same time, a few people also 
recognize the danger of China's moving too quickly too far 
because that could increase the chances that once again the 
pendulum might swing in the other direction. At the practical 
level, moving too fast may also create expectations on both sides 
that cannot be fulfilled to the satisfaction of either party. 
Financing the Four Modernizations 
Having sketched this broad general background, let us take a 
closer look at China's recent plans for modernization and how 
implementation has been proceeding, focusing on the interna-
tional financial aspects. 
The four modernizations refer to extremely ambitious plans 
promulgated after the Cultural Revolution to improve China's 
industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defense capa-
bility by the year 2000. The most concrete manifestation of these 
plans was the Ten Year Plan for National Development, 1976-
1985. 
To reach the Plan's ambitious growth targets, 120 very large 
new industrial investment projects were to be completed during 
those ten years, including ten iron and steel complexes, nine 
nonferrous metal complexes, eight coal mines, ten oil and gas 
fields, thirty power stations, six railways, five harbors, and 
numerous other infrastructure and manufacturing projects. China 
has not released estimates of the total cost of the projects, but the 
foreigners who consulted on many of them estimated that China 
would have needed upwards of $300 billion in new investment 
capital, of which about $70-80 billion would have had to be spent 
to pay for technology and equipment purchased abroad. Relying 
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on much too optimistic forecasts of domestic oil and coal produc-
tion and of world energy prices, Chinese planners were counting 
largely on increased revenues from exports to bankroll the foreign 
exchange cost of the projects. Although it has now been revealed 
that on most of the projects there were no economic feasibility 
studies (in fact many were extraordinarily poorly prepared even 
in engineering terms), China's Ministry of Foreign Trade began 
acting on the projects. By the end of 1978, China had negotiated 
for or expressed interest in about $40 billion worth of complete 
industrial plants. During 1978 alone, more than 500 Chinese 
delegations traveled to Western countries to shop for technology 
and equipment. 
The enticement of the huge China market may have played a 
role in the U.S. decision at the end of 1978 to establish diplomatic 
relations early in 1979. Although the U.S. embargo on commer-
cial relations with China was lifted in 1971, the most important 
steps in the process of commercial normalization were taken only 
in anticipation of or after full diplomatic recognition. A 1978 law 
authorized the PRC's access to some U.S. Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) programs, helping to finance U.S. agricultural 
exports, which increased threefold between 1978 and 1982. A 
bilateral trade agreement was negotiated, providing among other 
things most-favored-nation (MFN) status and access to Export-
Import Bank credits for China; this was approved by Congress in 
1979. China's eligibility for Overseas Private Investment Credit 
(OPIC) insurance programs was granted in 1980. With respect to 
U.S. foreign economic policy, these actions have placed China at 
least in the same favorable position as the more favored European 
Communist countries: Poland until December 1981, Romania 
until MFN status was withdrawn in 1982, and Hungary. 
During 1977-79, China and Western countries were feverishly 
negotiating official government and private commercial credit 
facilities, with China insisting especially on low-interest rates 
and skillfully playing one Western country off against the others. 
By the end of 1979, China had obtained firm commitments of 
more than $17 billion in official export credits ($7 billion from 
France, $5 billion from the U.K., nearly $2 billion each from 
Japan and Canada, $1 billion from Italy and smaller amounts from 
Belgium, Sweden, and Australia), plus over $10 billion in com-
mercial lines of credit. By the end of 1978 China had signed more 
than $7 billion in contracts to import turnkey plants, including 
several substantial deals with U.S. firms. This period is now 
characterized by China as a "leap outward" to foreign countries 
for capital and technology, in contrast to the earlier Great Leap 
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Forward (1956-1960), which relied on domestic mobilization of 
capital and labor. 
At the end of 1978 China's leaders made a series of decisions 
that caused the speeding China train to slow suddenly and to 
lurch in a different direction. A large number of investment 
projects were halted. The leaders realized not only that many 
projects were ill prepared, but also that there were severe con-
straints on China's ability to absorb quickly large amounts of 
foreign technology: bottlenecks in infrastructure, lack of skilled 
labor and technical-professional people, and widespread absence 
of managerial knowhow. After the splurge of 1978, China's 
balance of payments also showed much larger than planned 
deficits. Perhaps most important, a politically-based decision was 
made that—at least temporarily—the highest priority should be 
given to improving the standard of living. This required that 
agriculture and light industry be supported. So for this reason, 
too, investments were substantially cut, among them many of the 
120 projects for which numerous foreign contracts had already 
been signed. Several hundred large but purely domestically 
financed projects were also suspended during 1979-1980. 
In February 1979, the Ministry of Finance notified twenty 
Japanese firms that $2.6 billion of signed contracts had failed to 
receive Bank of China approval, so that the contracts and associ-
ated financial commitments were suspended. At the same time, a 
moratorium was ordered on signing major new contracts. The 
contract cancellations were headlined in the world press. Less 
known are that (1) the Chinese were within their legal rights to 
cancel under the fine print escape clauses in the contracts; (2) 
when such clauses were not included or not applicable, the 
Chinese side paid the financial penalty specified in the contract; 
and (3) some of the signed contracts were reinstated in later 
months. When negotiations on turnkey projects were resumed 
during the second half of 1979, a clearer sense of priorities 
became evident, for example, in stressing thermal and hydro-
electric projects. But foreign steel firms that during 1978 had been 
negotiating contracts worth $20 billion were told that most of the 
projects were being shelved indefinitely. 
What happened in China after 1979 cannot be understood 
without mentioning a series of policy decisions to decentralize 
economic decision-making in the areas of production, invest-
ments, finance, and foreign trade. The sudden decentralization 
was in good measure responsible for the paradoxical events after 
the so-called "readjustment program" was introduced at the 
beginning of 1979. 
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In 1979, the value of capital construction projects financed by 
the state budget remained at the same level as in 1978 (39.5 
billion yuan), and declined by almost 30% in 1980 (to 28.1 billion 
yuan). But total investments in capital construction continued to 
grow: 
1978 47.9 billion yuan 
1979 50.0 
1980 53.9 
This pattern derived from the fact that, due to decentralization, 
investments financed from outside the state budget increased 
sharply, more than tripling from 1978 to 1980: 
1978 8.4 billion yuan 
1979 10.5 
1980 25.8 
Capital construction requires skilled labor, machinery, and a 
wide range of material inputs, most of which are also needed by 
existing factories in their manufacturing operations. The un-
planned expansion of investment spending thus tends to cut the 
supply of resources available to the rest of the economy and to 
lead to lower current output, excess capacity, and shortages; 
these in turn cause delays in completing the ongoing capital 
construction projects. 
Further complicating the investment situation were the large, 
unplanned deficits which were incurred in the state budgets of 
1979 and 1980. These occurred for four main reasons: 
1. Excess investment spending by enterprises and regional au-
thorities lowered state budget revenues; 
2. Industrial wages and bonuses were boosted, which reduced 
enterprise profits and state revenues as well; 
3. Agricultural procurement prices were increased while retail 
food prices were kept unchanged, requiring larger subsidies; 
4. The substantial cost of China's 1979 military offensive in 
Vietnam had to be financed. 
To make up part of the deficit, the government printed money, 
thus generating inflationary pressures; in some ways this was 
analogous to budget deficit-triggered inflationary pressures in 
Western countries. Fundamentally, inflationary pressures emerged 
because increases in consumer purchasing power, investments, 
and government spending exceeded the growth of output. 
Open inflation—which accompanied decentralization and the 
growth of private markets—is a special anathema to conservative 
Communist regimes. It triggered an even more drastic second 
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adjustment at the beginning of 1981—exactly two years after the 
first adjustment. Most state budget expenditures were cut, but 
capital construction spending was slashed by far proportionately 
the most (in billion yuan): 
Total Financed by Outside the 
Investments state budget state budget 
1980 53.9 28.1 25.8 
1981 55.0 24.2 30.8 
(original plan) 
1981 30.0 17.0 13.0 
(revised plan) 
Thus, in 1981 centrally- and locally-financed investments de-
clined by nearly 50% from levels reached earlier. A large number 
of ongoing projects, including many for which imports were 
scheduled from the West, were suspended or cancelled. Invest-
ment and foreign trade decisionmaking were also significantly 
recentralized. The series of contract cancellations with foreign, 
including U.S., suppliers again made international headlines. 
Drastic reductions in investments necessitated temporary re-
ductions in heavy industrial output, so that in 1981 production 
fell by more than 4% while light industry expanded at double-
digit rates for the second year in a row. Light industry growing 
more rapidly than heavy industry for a few years has given rise to 
much speculation in the West that China may be abandoning the 
traditional Communist economic strategy of giving the highest 
priority to the generally less efficient heavy industrial sector. The 
Chinese, by contrast, are talking only about a readjustment. The 
figures for 1982 bear them out: heavy industry grew by 9%, light 
industry by 5.6%. In agriculture, good weather and a policy of 
incentive and increased economic freedom that has been in effect 
since 1978 have reinforced each other to yield an average annual 
output increase of about 7%. 
Since 1977, China's exports have increased substantially every 
year while import growth has been very erratic, reflecting the 
harvest-determined need for grain and other agricultural products 
and the wide swings in investments. During both 1981 and 1982, 
total imports declined. In 1982 China had a $5 billion trade 
surplus. Since its foreign indebtedness is low and the country has 
considerable invisible earnings, China's current account was also 
in surplus. This means that China has become a significant net 
lender, not a borrower, on the international financial markets. 
Thus, although since 1978 China has worked hard to line up 
about $30 billion worth of official and private credits, it has taken 
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very little advantage of its borrowing opportunities. This is in part 
because of its traditional abhorrence of debt, in part because of the 
high interest rates which it loathes to pay, in part because of the 
example of Poland's, Romania's, and many less developed coun-
tries' debt-servicing problems, and in part because of its relatively 
strong current account position. In fact, since 1979 the Bank of 
China has loaned $3.5 billion to enterprises in Hong Kong and has 
taken part in fifteen Eurocurrency syndicated loans totaling $1.5 
billion, acting as principal lender or co-manager. The Bank of 
China has also taken over the foreign financing of several projects 
in China and has begun to extend low-interest credits to those 
purchasing Chinese ships and machinery. But China is not averse 
to borrowing if it needs money and ,the terms are right, as shown 
by its activities in the IMF and the World Bank, which it joined in 
1980. Some experts in the West believe that China's program of 
readjustment may well be coming to an end, and that now 
(mid-1983) the country is poised to undertake a large investment 
and import program, for which it will need substantial foreign 
financing. This view appears to have good rationale and prece-
dents to support it. 
When in 1980 China joined the IMF, its quota was set at SDR 
1.8 billion, which has made it the eighth-ranking member (after 
the US, Britain, West Germany, Japan, France, Saudi Arabia, and 
Italy), replacing India which moved down to the ninth-ranking 
spot. Since Peking took over the membership from Taiwan, it was 
able to join without having to put up any resources. Long ago 
Taiwan paid in 470,000 ounces of gold as its (25% of quota) 
membership contribution, using gold Peking says belonged to 
China. The arrangement worked out was that Taiwan sold the 
gold to the IMF at the former official price of $35 an ounce plus 
one-third of the difference between the official price and the then 
current market value of gold, leaving behind two thirds of the 
increase in the market value, which covered China's reserve 
tranche contribution to the IMF. In 1980 China borrowed its first 
(reserve) tranche of SDR 450 million. In March of 1981 the Fund 
approved China's request for a stand-by arrangement in the first 
credit tranche, authorizing purchases of up to SDR 450 million 
over a 12-month period to support China's 1981 economic stabil-
ization program. 
China is also a member of the World Bank, where it qualifies 
for special, highly concessionary (International Development 
Association) loans—i.e., with fifty year maturity at approximately 
one percent interest. In early 1983 China received two loans 
totaling about $300 million to develop two oil fields. 
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To summarize, there are four types of financing to which 
China (or any country) potentially has access: 
1. Loans from international and regional financial institutions, 
such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
2. Loans and guarantees from official government agencies, such 
as the Eximbank and CCC in the U.S. So far China has taken up 
only a fraction of the credit lines offered by Western govern-
ments, probably borrowing not more than about $2 billion. 
3. Credits from private sources, for example, from suppliers or 
from commercial banks. So far China has used these facilities 
sparingly; its outstanding medium- and long-term debt in this 
category is probably under $5 billion. 
4. Direct foreign investment, i.e., equity capital, where foreigners 
invest in joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. Since 
1979 China has been permitting and encouraging foreign 
investment, especially in its four special economic zones, all 
located strategically close to Hong Kong. By June 1983, $5.8 
billion in foreign investment commitments had been made(The 
Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1983), although only a fraction of 
that amount had actually been disbursed. Between 1979 and 
the end of June, 1983, China reportedly signed 10,000 joint 
ventures and other types of investment contracts with foreign 
firms, most of them small (Liu Shulong, deputy head of the 
Department of Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade, speaking at an investment seminar in 
Hong Kong). 
Foreign Investment in the Special Economic Zones 
As far as the legal framework for direct foreign investments is 
concerned, China's laws are the most liberal among the Commu-
nist states, matched only by Hungary since last year. In particular, 
the facts and implications of foreign investment in the special 
economic zones are most interesting. These zones are capitalist-
type enclaves where foreign firms are permitted to set up wholly-
owned production facilities, to have the right to hire and fire 
workers, to reward hard work with pay scales two to three times 
the average wage in China, and to adjust production plans in 
response to shifts in foreign market demand. The attractions for 
foreign firms are cheap labor, inexpensive land, and low taxes, 
but there are very serious problems also. These include lack of 
developed infrastructure, untrained and inexperienced labor, low 
productivity on the part of workers and managers, uneven prod-
uct quality, and a huge government bureaucracy that can cause 
production delays. All these raise costs of production unpredicta-
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bly. Foreign-owned enterprises in the special economic zones and 
joint ventures located there and elsewhere in China do not have 
automatic access to China's domestic market but must export 
most or all of their output. The few ventures that are allowed to 
sell in China usually face strict market limitations. For example, 
the Camel factory is prohibited from marketing cigarettes outside 
the special economic zone where it is located, as are most others. 
Three of the four zones are in Guangdong Province—Shen-
zhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou. The fourth is Xiamen, in nearby 
Fujian province. Shenzhen (150 square miles) is by far the most 
important, with Zhuhai a distant second, both located next to 
Hong Kong. The other two zones, in nearby seaport towns, are 
still in the preparatory stage. Much of the investment, en-
trepreneurship, and export business generated by firms located in 
the special economic zones originates in Hong Kong, one of the 
most purely capitalist bastions of free enterprise anywhere to be 
found. 
The attraction for China is that these ventures generate foreign 
exchange, bring in capital, create jobs and train workers. As of 
mid-1983, China is considering steps to ease further its invest-
ment regulations, simplify investment procedures, and once 
again delegate more power to provincial authorities to sign 
contracts. According to the official of the Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade previously cited, foreign funds 
would be used mainly to develop energy resources, construct 
transportation facilities, and renovate industrial enterprises (The 
Wall Street Journal, July 7, 1983). 
The problem for China is the incompatibility of capitalist ways 
of doing business—and of capitalist values—in the special eco-
nomic zones with the traditional, egalitarian, and highly reg-
imented modes of operation elsewhere in the country. There is 
also the danger of a political backlash which could radically alter, 
once again, China's domestic as well as foreign policies. 
The problem of compatibility is a serious one already, as 
described by a recent report in The Wall Street Journal (March 3, 
1983): 
Guangdong province "hasn ' t gone capitalist" and still 
practices socialism, a senior provincial official vigorously 
maintained at China's recent National People's Congress in 
Peking. 
The Guangdong official's defensive remarks indicate 
that ideological conflicts have intensified between the 
province, which borders the capitalist bastion of Hong 
Kong, and other parts of China. . . . its proximity to Hong 
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Kong has meant that it is the most open to outside influ-
ences. 
Its liberal trade policies, adopted three years ago, have 
given an important boost to China's economic growth. But 
in addition to foreign investment, the policies also have 
given Guangdong more opportunities to experiment with 
capitalism and to absorb what Chinese leaders consider 
undesirable bourgeois values from the outside world. 
Some of those values are spilling over into other 
provinces, sparking resistance. At the National People's 
Congress, the Guangdong official charged that some inland 
provinces had begun discriminating against travelers from 
Guangdong. When employees of Guangdong state-run en-
terprises arrive at train stations outside their home prov-
ince, they are separated from other travelers, questioned, 
and, in most cases, their luggage is searched, he said. 
The inland-province officials apparently are looking for 
consumer goods. Tape recorders, television sets and the 
like are relatively easy to get in Guangdong, unlike in the 
rest of China, because they are either smuggled in or 
brought in legally by relatives from Hong Kong. Guang-
dong entrepreneurs then smuggle the goods to neighboring 
provinces, where they reap hefty profits. 
Officials in the inland provinces are angry because such 
black-market activities muddle their economic plans and 
spread consumerism and hedonism. It is also likely that 
they are jealous of Guangdong's special status. 
Because of the open-door policies, between 80% and 
90% of foreign investment in China from 1979 to 1982 has 
been in Guangdong. And Guangdong residents enjoy a 
substantially higher standard of living and a degree of 
ideological independence unmatched elsewhere in China. 
This is largely due to the influence of the British colony 
of Hong Kong, most of whose 5.5 million residents have 
roots in Guangdong. About one million Hong Kong people 
visit their hometowns in Guangdong each year bringing 
with them foreign exchange and consumer goods as well as 
capitalist values. Many Guangdong young people ape 
Hong Kong fashions, listen to Hong Kong radio stations 
and watch Hong Kong television stations, which broadcast 
many programs from Europe, Japan and the U.S. 
Pressed by Peking, the Guangdong government cam-
paigned against bourgeois influences in late 1981. It tried 
to persuade local residents not to watch Hong Kong TV 
programs in a bid to avoid being ' 'poisoned" by capitalist 
vices. The campaign failed. 
To stop smuggling to other parts of China, the provin-
cial government last year prohibited the resale of imported 
81 
consumer goods without special permission. And it accel-
erated the fight against economic crimes such as corruption 
and smuggling. 
The official goal seems to be to bind Shenzhen ever more 
closely to Hong Kong and to isolate it (and the other economic 
zones) more completely from the rest of the country. The customs 
check between Shenzhen and Hong Kong will end soon, at which 
time the customs and passport checkpoints will be relocated to 
the China-Shenzhen border. 
Another interesting new development has just been reported 
by The Wall Street Journal (June 28, 1983). In addition to the 
equity participation foreign companies are allowed to have in the 
zones and in other China-based joint ventures, foreign investors 
can now also buy shares (up to 49% of total holdings) in 
designated Chinese state enterprises operating in the special 
economic zones. It has been officially announced that a few such 
Chinese companies intend to issue common and preferred stocks 
as well as bonds for sale abroad. 
Another prospective new development is direct investment by 
China in existing firms in Western countries as a way of acquiring 
some of the raw materials as well as technology and know-how 
China needs. The first such venture was the purchase by the 
Nanjing Telecommunications Works of $2 million of convertible 
preferred stock of a U.S. manufacturer of computer printers, 
Santec Corporation, headquartered in New Hampshire. 
Although the significance of all these new steps for altering 
China's centrally planned economic system should not be exagge-
rated, they do signal a surprising willingness by China's leaders 
to experiment with new ways of financing the four moderniza-
tions. 
Conclusions 
1. In principle, a country's demand for foreign capital is 
constrained by one of two considerations: the need to remain 
creditworthy, i.e., to maintain a reasonable debt-service ratio; and 
the need to ensure that the resources borrowed or invested from 
abroad are used wisely, yielding a rate of return in excess of cost. 
While nearly all developing countries today face the first con-
straint, for China the second consideration is much more impor-
tant. That is, while China remains eminently creditworthy, its 
ability effectively to absorb a large inflow of resources is yet to be 
demonstrated. 
2. China's foreign economic policies have been unsteady. 
From a foreign point of view, decisionmakers often appear to 
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follow puzzling zigzags. Although the post-Mao leadership has 
been pushing a policy of opening ever wider China's windows 
and doors to the world market, the policy has been implemented 
in an inconsistent fashion. This sometimes reflects a lack of 
sophisticated understanding of the consequences of their own 
plans and actions, which therefore require frequent revisions. At 
other times it reflects experimentation, and at yet other times the 
occasionally arbitrary policy consequences of domestic political 
disagreements. 
3. Even if China were to continue on its course of economic 
liberalization, that path does not automatically assure economic 
success in the long run. Among the many problems and pitfalls, a 
particularly important one is that in the absence of correct prices, 
allowing market forces to play some role in resource allocation 
may yield outcomes that are not necessarily positive, especially 
outside of agriculture. Furthermore, it is not clear how incentive 
wages can be introduced in Chinese factories when there is so 
much surplus labor inside and outside the factory gates. The 
impact of the special economic zones on labor morale elsewhere 
in China is another imponderable. 
4. It is difficult to say how long China's domestic and foreign 
economic liberalization will continue. The top of the current 
leadership hierarchy is committed to the current policy, but the 
lower level party hierarchy has neither the experience nor the 
vested interest to implement it. Whether a new party and profes-
sional elite can be created, and in a timely fashion, to make the 
new policies work is an open question. On the other hand, the 
more quickly and daringly economic liberalization is introduced, 
the greater the danger of mistakes and some kind of an economic 
and political backlash. 
5. At present, there are potentially lucrative trade, investment, 
and banking opportunities in China. The risks, however, are also 
considerable, for the reasons enumerated. 
6. It is not possible to predict scientifically the long run 
economic policies and performance of China because there are too 
many complex variables that affect policies and outcomes. But 
those who understand the historical, cultural, political, and 
economic forces at work, and their interactions, are less likely to 
go wrong in their forecasts than those who rely on partial 
assessments only. 
SELECTED REFERENCES 
John L. Davie and Dean W. Carver, "China's International Trade and Finance," 
in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, China Under the Four Moderniza-
83 
tions, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, December 30, 1982). 
Nai-Ruenn Chen, "China's Capital Construction: Current Retrenchment and 
Prospects for Foreign Participation," in Joint Economic Committee, op. cit. 
Vladimir N. Pregelj, "Normalization of U. S. Commercial Relations with the 
People's Republic of China: United States Statutory and Regulatory Aspects," in 
Joint Economic Committee, op. cit. 
Wharton Econometrics, Centrally Planned Economies Service, "Outlook for 
the People's Republic of China," Outlook for Centrally Planned Economies 
(Washington, D.C.: Wharton Econometrics, March 1983). 
Paul Marer, "Sources and Uses of Funds by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank and the Role of the Socialist Countries in the International 
Monetary System," paper presented at the Sixth U.S.-Hungarian Roundtable on 
Economics, Budapest, 1981 (revised). 
84 
SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 
A NEGATIVE RATCHET PROCESS? 
David M. Lamp ton 
U.S.-China relations truly are at a critical juncture. While we 
are moving away from a naive and unrealistic euphoric sense that 
there are no bounds to what we can accomplish rapidly, and that 
is good, we also are seeing an erosion of mutual confidence 
through the cumulative impact of individually minor events— 
that is not healthy. Americans now are learning the limits that a 
relatively free and open society is encountering in dealing with a 
still secretive, closed, and command society. The Chinese, for 
their part, are experiencing the frustrations of dealing with a 
pluralist system. Once grandiose expectations for trade with The 
People's Republic (PRC) are running up against the reality that a 
poor country cannot afford to buy much. This is a healthy 
process, if disillusion, mutual dissatisfaction, and suspicion do 
not exceed the capacity of our respective political systems to 
manage. We must move ahead positively in those areas where 
genuine progress is possible, as I believe it is. At the moment, 
however, serious retrogression is a distinct possibility. That 
could, in turn, jeopardize the global strjategic vision which 
brought us together in the early 1970s. 
I shall outline the dimensions of the problems which currently 
exist between China and the United States and then' pose two 
additional questions: What does past experience tell us is the 
origin of these difficulties? Where do we go from here? 
Assessing Today's Relationship 
In assessing the state of bilateral relations today we first must 
ask, compared to when and what? If our point of perspective is 
1950, today's relationship with the PRC is so much better along 
every dimension that elaboration is not required. We have gone 
from a period of no trade, no cultural exchange, no tourism, no 
student exchange, no scientific cooperation, and war to a relation-
ship that has developed substantially. If our perspective is 1972 
and the Nixon trip, things have evolved considerably since then. 
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If we go back only to the first half of 1978, prior to normalization, 
our relationship is considerably more extensive. Trade has grown 
greatly, we have students and researchers in both countries, and 
there is a network of interagency bilateral agreements connecting, 
however tenuously, the bureaucracies of our two countries. If, 
however, we use as our baseline for evaluation the late 1978 to 
early 1980 period, there has been some significant deterioration 
in the relationship between Washington and Beijing. 
As the Chinese say, ' ' the river doesn't freeze in a single 
night," and so it has been with the ties between our two nations. 
A number of individually minor events are having a destructive 
cumulative impact. Five broad areas of friction are particularly 
important, with Taiwan and technology transfer issues assuming 
the greatest importance. 
First, during the 1980-1982 period, Sino-American trade was 
up 7.9% (in current dollars), not really an impressive perfor-
mance, if inflation is taken into account. Although it certainly is 
unrealistic to expect the rapid growth rates of the previous period, 
there has been a genuine decline in the rate of trade expansion. 
This slowdown reflects retrenchment in both countries, a world-
wide economic slowdown, and a conscious Chinese decision to 
shift purchases away from the U.S. in some cases. In 1982, trade 
between the U.S. and China dropped 6% over 1981. U.S. exports 
to China were off 19% during the same period. What accounts for 
this? Most of the explanation has been budget deficits in China, 
runaway capital construction and Beijing's recognition that the 
importation of foreign technology requires massive collateral 
investments in supporting infrastructure. 
More recently, however, conflicts in the economic relation-
ship have intruded. For instance, the on-again off-again textile 
talks (resumed in March 1983) have floundered because the two 
sides are unable to reach agreement on import quotas and 
categories of products to be covered by quotas. The U.S. has 
unilaterally imposed its own textile quotas on the Chinese pend-
ing final resolution of the issue. The Chinese, in turn, retaliated 
by saying they would not buy U.S. cotton, soybeans, and syn-
thetic fibers and that they would buy grain from other suppliers 
whenever possible. Parenthetically, this move involved consider-
able symbolism. Beijing selected its targets carefully, cutting off 
imports of products for which there already were excessive 
stockpiles or of products which have seen significant increases in 
domestic production. 
Another problem is intruding into the trade relationship and 
its potential for damage may be more far-reaching than that of the 
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textile issue. This problem also demonstrates how far the Chinese 
are from understanding how our political and institutional system 
works. A U.S. court has enjoined the Chinese government to 
assume the liabilities of the Qing Dynasty to foreign (American) 
bondholders of the Huguang Railroad. The Chinese Nationalists 
had long ago repudiated the obligations of the Qing Dynasty 
(which fell in 1911) and Beijing predictably has repudiated the 
U.S. court's judgment, claiming sovereign immunity. Moreover, 
Beijing simply does not find it credible that Washington cannot 
control the courts, if it but had the will. If the court and the 
plaintiffs seek to attach Chinese property in the U.S., the Chinese 
already have said that they too would retaliate. As we have seen 
in the issues of textiles and defections (below), the Chinese will 
retaliate. There is a ratchet effect with each cycle locking the 
relationship into a new low. 
Turning to the cultural and eduation area, we have a number 
of points of friction. During 1982, I was part of a group which 
held a series of discussions with various Chinese officials, one of 
whom was China's Minister of Culture Zhu Muzhi. The Minister 
spent a significant period asking for our delegation's help in 
correcting what he called "certain unpleasant things" in Sino-
American relations. He apparently had in mind issues such as the 
defection of cultural and sports personalities and a spate of stories 
in the American media about looming defections among Chinese 
students and scholars. Indeed, some reports assert that as many as 
1,000 of the approximately 9,000-10,000 Chinese students and 
scholars now in the U.S. already have approached (or may be 
about to approach) the U.S. government. Information I have 
indicates that this number is far too high. Beijing clearly would 
like Washington to assure the return of Chinese citizens. But, 
there is little way that we can accommodate Beijing on this point 
and remain consistent with deeply held values in our own 
society. Moreover, no politician wants to bear the onus of 
forcefully repatriating people. The recent rupture of official 
cultural relations between our two countries over the issue of 
granting asylum to the tennis star Hu Na shows just what 
potential havoc this can cause. 
Another issue in the cultural realm concerns Chinese access to 
American information, technology, and society, especially when 
some Americans perceive a lack of reciprocity. At present, there 
are about 9,000-10,000 Chinese students and scholars in the 
United States. The access of American scholars to China has been 
both numerically and qualitatively less, and there has even been 
some recent slippage in this. However, it is unclear what reci-
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procity means in the context of two such different societies. Even 
murkier is the issue of how a more equitable relationship can be 
achieved. Finally, if one were to seek to restrict Chinese access to 
our technology, how could that be done within the framework of 
prevalent U.S. academic freedoms and the widespread diffusion 
of information? Most basic of all, is it in our long-run interest to 
impede the flow of most technical information to China? (More on 
technology transfer below.) 
The Chinese also have not been entirely happy with the 
explosion in the number of their students in America. Beijing did 
not anticipate, I believe, how much education here costs. Conse-
quently, Beijing intends eventually to reduce the number of 
students and scholars studying here to something like 4,000-
5,000 persons. Most immediately, apparently China will cut the 
number of government-funded students and scholars by 20 per-
cent. Last year, the regime began to clamp down on exit visas for 
would-be students and scholars who were not state-supported. 
The problems being encountered in the educational exchange 
have deep cultural roots, as well as roots in the obvious dif-
ferences in our socio-political systems. For example, when 
abroad, Westerners expect the host government to provide clear 
legal guidelines to govern behavior. In China, however, law 
historically has played a much diminished role, and even when it 
exists it frequently is vague. And so it is with China's State Secret 
Law. The law prohibits the transfer to foreigners of broad and 
vague categories of information and concludes with the catch-all 
phrase, and "all other state affairs which should be kept secret.'' 
While all states have a right and a duty to protect national security 
information, the Western researcher chafes under the ambiguity. 
Western scholars, and the Chinese with whom they must deal, are 
unsure where the bounds of the permissible may be. Moreover, 
Chinese scholars, who frequently have less access to information 
than many of the visiting American researchers, are justifiably 
resentful. 
Another area of anxiety in Sino-American relations concerns 
Beijing's pas de deux with Moscow. The Chinese and the Soviets 
recently have concluded a second round of negotiations directed 
toward eventual normalization of their relations. We must fully 
expect that, over time, there will be an improvement in their 
bilateral ties, that the improvement will, in all likelihood, be 
gradual, and that it will expand from trade and culture to limited 
military disengagement. Indeed, on March 10, 1983, China and 
the Soviet Union reached a trade agreement which will triple 
trade levels for 1983, though the absolute value of the commerce 
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still is a modest $1 billion. Too, the Chinese are preparing to 
receive some Russian students and recently some Chinese aca-
demics have traveled to the Soviet Union. When I was in China 
during the summer and fall of 1982, newspapers were calling for 
increased emphasis on Russian language instruction and the 
bookstores were stocking more Russian language materials. A 
recent report in Far Eastern Economic Review suggests that China 
(at least from the Chinese perspective) may have softened its 
negotiating position with respect to the border issue and the 
conditions for normalization. 
Parenthetically, it is a profound mistake to assume that a high 
degree of hostility between the Chinese and the Soviets is an 
enduring feature of their relationship. Middle-level managers and 
cadres whom I met in China fequently had been educated in the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s, some spoke Russian, and many 
individuals have fond memories of that era of amity. People 
trained in the Soviet Union in the 1950s are moving in increasing 
numbers into significant policy positions today. The implications 
of this are unclear. 
Paralleling recent changes in the Sino-Soviet relationship has 
been a pronounced Chinese tilt toward the Third World. The most 
conspicuous manifestation of this "new look'' policy was Premier 
Zhao Ziyang's multi-nation tour of Africa in December 1982-
January 1983. The Chinese are pursuing a policy of diplomatic 
independence from the superpowers and emphasizing "South-
South" cooperation, while simultaneously trying to preserve the 
economic, educational, and technical advantages of the links to 
the West. Consequently, there has been a decided shift in the 
rhetoric used to describe the world and America's role in it. While 
expected, the rhetoric which accompanies this more independent 
line is worrisome. The Chinese position seems to be evolving 
toward the view that "imperialism" (the U.S.)and "hegemo-
nism" (the Soviet Union) are coequal threats to global peace. 
Sometimes the formulation is that both superpowers are simply 
hegemonist. This line began to strongly emerge after the Twelfth 
Party Congress of September 1982. If this constitutes a new 
strategic Chinese assessment, it would represent a departure from 
the strategic consensus which brought our two nations closer in 
the 1970s. In his major address to the September Party Congress, 
General-Secretary Hu Yaobang said that one of the principal 
purposes of the Party is to "carry on the struggle against imperial-
ism and hegemonism in defense of world peace." Indeed, Hu 
mentioned imperialism first. What, if anything, that means re-
mains to be seen. 
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Predictably, this has not pleased Washington. Then Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Holdridge said 
in an address to The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations 
in December 1982 that, "we have not—indeed, we could not— 
ignore some of the more simplistic rhetoric that has been emanat-
ing from Beijing of late. To put it bluntly, we take exception to 
Chinese references to us as 'hegemonists' and expect better from 
the Chinese than being lumped together with the Soviets as the 
cause of all the world's ills." 
Finally, I come to what most people consider to be the central 
point of divergence between our two countries—relations with 
Taiwan. The issue, quite simply, is whether or not American 
termination of arms sales to Taiwan will have as its precondition a 
statement by Beijing that the PRC will not employ force in its 
ongoing attempt to reunify the country. At the time normalization 
was announced on December 15, 1978, this issue remained 
unresolved. The Chinese merely agreed not to contradict our 
unilateral statement that we expected a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan problem. Moreover, both sides agreed that the U.S. would 
"maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations 
with the people of Taiwan." That these "commercial and other 
unofficial relations" would include military sales to Taiwan was 
made clear to the Chinese throughout the normalization negotia-
tions. At the time, Chairman and Premier Hua Guofeng noted that 
China could not agree to this "but nevertheless, the joint commu-
nique was reached." In the wake of normalization, in April 1979, 
The President signed into law the Taiwan Relations Act which 
mandated Congress and the President "to provide Taiwan with 
arms of a defensive character" and "to maintain the capacity of 
the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan." Beijing asserts that 
this domestic law of the U.S. government infringes upon Chinese 
sovereignty and that a domestic law cannot supersede a negoti-
ated agreement between two sovereign entities. Beijing now 
demands that the Reagan Administration commit itself to a 
gradual reduction in arms sales and that a termination date be set. 
There have been several efforts to put this issue behind us, one 
of which was the August 17, 1982, Joint Communique ("Shang-
hai II"). This document, however, did not solve the fundamental 
issue. Indeed, the friction is at least as great now as it was before 
the communique. President Reagan is unwilling to set a terminal 
date after which we will not provide weapons to Taiwan and the 
Chinese leadership, driven by internal constituencies, is seeking 
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to extract precisely this concession. Both sides are locked into 
mutually exclusive positions and no easy resolution appears at 
hand. 
In February 1983, Secretary of State Shultz went to China in 
order to try to defuse the issue once again. No sooner had he 
returned from the PRC, however, than President Reagan gave an 
interview to a periodical called Human Events. He essentially 
said that all we promised in the August 17th Communique was 
that if the Chinese will promise not to use force, then we would 
end arms sales to Taiwan. Neither the August Communique nor 
Secretary Shultz's trip had changed the situation materially. 
Thus far, the above picture of Sino-American relations has 
been painted in somber hues. We must keep all of this in 
perspective. There still is considerable public and private inter-
course between our two countries. The question confronting 
policy makers is: How can we maintain and expand these 
activities and benefits, on the one hand, and not capitulate on 
fundamental principles on the other? 
Historical Lessons In The Sino-American Relationship 
As I survey the history of Sino-American ties, and past 
Chinese behavior, I think five "givens" in the relationship 
emerge. These can help us understand the present and orient 
policy for the future. 
First, leadership instability, either in China or in the U.S., 
does not provide fertile soil for the relationship. Every major 
recent advance in Sino-American ties has occurred in the pres-
ence of comparatively stable leadership in both capitals. Nixon, 
for instance, went to China in the wake of Lin Biao's purge in 
1971. In America, the Watergate Era essentially put China policy 
on the back burner. President Ford was unable vigorously to 
pursue China policy because of electoral constraints and the 
Reagan challenge. Only when Jimmy Carter was at a relatively 
strong point in his presidency was he willing to assume the risks 
of moving ahead on China policy. 
In my view, the Chinese now believe that by waiting, and 
taking a rigid position with Washington, there is a healthy 
probability that Reagan may not run, or may not be reelected if he 
does. From Beijing's perspective, most of the likely presidential 
contenders are preferable. For our part, some people in the U.S. 
have concerns about leadership stability in the PRC. Can we make 
commitments with a reasonable expectation that there will not be 
an unpredicted policy departure in Beijing? There has been 
considerable discussion about how much younger the Chinese 
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leadership is; " the new look." Here one has to separate rhetoric 
from reality. The reality of the Politburo emerging from the 
Twelfth Party Congress of September 1982 is as follows: The 
Politburo members have an average age of 72.5 years. The 
Politburo's Standing Committee has an average age of 74.5 years. 
The increasingly important Secretariat is younger, with members 
of that body averaging 66 years old. If one looks at the State 
apparatus, and this is becoming more important, the premier and 
vice-premiers taken together have an average age of 66. It is true 
that new and younger leaders are moving into the ministries and 
into provincial governments throughout the country. This is 
important and it is a positive development. However, the basic 
question remains. What expectations for stability can we have? 
Moreover, the military in China is unhappy about previous 
cuts in its budget and not pleased to find that defense moderniza-
tion is a clear fourth priority among the four modernizations. Too, 
there is some indication that the military resists what it sees as 
ideological deviations, increasing dependence on the West, in-
creasing penetration of Chinese society by our entrepreneurial 
and cultural forces, and the inevitable domestic social conse-
quences of all this. The American government, then, is not 
persuaded of China's elite stability, youth, dynamism, firmness, 
and capacity to "stay the course." What one sees on both sides, I 
believe, is a perception that nothing is to be gained by making 
concessions now. 
The second lesson of history is that advances in Sino-Ameri-
can relations have been made when the United States has a 
passably good relationship with the Soviet Union. Simply put, 
when Beijing thinks that Washington has the option of cooperat-
ing with Moscow, China has an incentive to be somewhat more 
accommodating. But, when the PRC sees us unalterably locked 
into conflict with Moscow, it has little incentive to make conces-
sions to us, believing that we have foregone an important strategic 
alternative. For example, the major breakthrough in Sino-
American relations in 1971-1972 occurred on the eve of SALT I. 
The Carter normalization occurred in late 1978, on the eve of 
SALT II. The point is, the Chinese have been most accommodat-
ing when we looked like we had a chance to improve our position 
with the Soviets. At present, the Chinese seem genuinely to 
discount the possibility of Washington and Moscow significantly 
improving their bilateral ties. This, in turn, leaves Beijing free to 
move closer to Moscow and, in the process, extract from Wash-
ington additional concessions, whether it be on Taiwan, technol-
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ogy transfer, or trade. What we now are seeing is the natural result 
of the polarization of the Soviet-American relationship. 
There is one exception to the general pattern of the Chinese 
discounting the possibility of significant Soviet-American agree-
ment in the near term—this is the intermediate missile talks in 
Europe. Beijing fears that those talks could produce a shift of 
Soviet SS-20 missiles to the Soviet Far East. In general, however, I 
suspect that the Chinese are not terribly worried about our 
dramatically improving ties with the Soviet Union any time soon. 
A third lesson from history is that when we have good 
relations with Japan and NATO, the Chinese take us more 
seriously. We carry more clout in Beijing when we are effectively 
influencing European capitals and Tokyo. We certainly have not 
projected this image with the ongoing and highly visible trade 
quarrels with Japan and the friction concerning Tokyo's defense 
priorities. Looking to relations with our NATO allies, the bobbing 
and weaving on grain and pipeline policy, and the growing 
argument over Pershing II and cruise missiles, has reinforced a 
Chinese image of the West as in disarray, or at least a West in 
which the United States cannot be an effective leader. We would 
improve our relations with China considerably if we mended 
fences with our allies and got something positive going with 
Moscow. That is a pretty big "if," I will be the first to concede. 
As a fourth lesson, history also tells us that when the Chinese 
and American economies are perceived as healthy, we have a 
much better relationship. In times of economic hardship, both 
economies tend to become increasingly protectionist. Looking at 
the halcyon days of 1978-1980 in the Sino-American relationship, 
the Chinese had ambitious (indeed unrealistic) growth objectives. 
They had plans to build 120 key plant. They planned to import 
massively from abroad to accomplish these objectives. Simul-
taneously, the U.S. had " l o w " unemployment, "on ly" 5.8%, 
which does not look so bad when compared to today's double 
digit unemployment. The growth rate for the Chinese GNP in the 
1978-1980 period was in the vicinity of 10 percent and, though 
not all of that increase was wise or productive, there was a sense 
of forward movement. The U.S. was growing, too, albeit with 
increasing inflation. Now, both economies are growing at much 
slower rates (though for China "slower" may end up being 
"faster"). The Chinese growth rate last year (1982) was in the 
4.5-5.0 percent range, down from the 1978-1980 rate mentioned 
above. In the U.S., GNP fell by 1.8 percent (when adjusted for 
inflation) in 1982, giving us a GNP no bigger in 1982 than it had 
been in 1979. In both societies, slow or negative growth feeds 
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protectionist sentiment. I should mention, however, that at pre-
sent China's leaders seem extremely confident of their economic 
position. 
To mention Chinese protectionism requires some elaboration. 
When I was in China in November 1982,1 had the opportunity to 
speak with representatives of the Ministry of Machine Building. 
This ministry, along with others, is increasingly being judged by 
profitability criteria. Consequently, these ministries seek to re-
duce imports so that their products will sell better in China's 
domestic market. The Machine Building Ministry quite frankly 
acknowledged that its first priority was to protect domestic 
industries. Of coure, protectionism is not so obvious because 
trade is a state monopoly. Decisions are made in the bowels of the 
bureaucracy. China doesn't have the spectacle of congressional 
fights. But, the Chinese foreign trade structure is fundamentally 
protectionist. Protectionism is more obvious in the U.S.; this 
pressure is manifest in textiles (as we observed above), shoes, 
mushrooms, and even spearmint. It is very clear why the U.S. is 
imposing unilateral quotas on Chinese textiles. There is high 
unemployment in our textile and garment industries and Chinese 
textile exports in certain categories have grown rapidly. More-
over, under the Multi-Fiber Agreement, the U.S. cannot make 
large concessions to the Chinese without affecting our textile 
relationship with Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea and other 
major exporters. 
On the textile issue, the Chinese have a different view. From 
their vantage point, they have had a persistent and large bilateral 
trade deficit with the United States. In their view, Washington is 
unfairly constraining the growth of one export product which 
might help offset that persistent imbalance. From 1978 through 
1982, the cumulative Chinese trade deficit with the U.S. was 
about 7.35 billion American dollars. China bought 2.23 dollars of 
U.S. products for every dollar of Chinese products we purchased. 
In this situation, Beijing can easily turn our arguments against 
Japanese trade barriers on us. "How can we buy from you?" , the 
Chinese ask, "If you won't buy from us?" I should point out that 
Chinese trade statistics are calculated differently than ours and 
exclude "invisibles." China's trade position is not as bad as 
Beijing would have us think. 
Economic downturns inevitably produce protectionism. The 
best remedy to this is sustained economic growth in both so-
cieties. In the interim, we need to restrain protectionist impulses. 
We ought to note that one of the carrots which the Soviets held 
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out to the Chinese in their recent trade agreement was the promise 
of balanced bilateral trade. 
The final historical lesson I wish to assess is what the Chinese 
call the "Ti-Yong" ("essence" vs. "use") dilemma. The Chinese 
now, and ever since at least the mid-19th century, have wanted 
the " th ings" and "techniques" of the West without simul-
taneously having to adopt our values. This is only partially a 
political phenomenon—more fundamentally, it is cultural. As 
trade and cultural exchanges have developed, China's elite has 
ever more clearly seen that it is exceedingly difficult to separate 
Western technique from the cultural matrix which gave rise to it 
and which sustains it. In Beijing you can see segments of The 
ABC Evening News on television. Voice of America is a popular 
radio station. In short, the American cultural penetration of China 
has gone on at a relatively rapid rate. Unsurprisingly, the regime 
fears a loss of ideological and ultimately of political control. A 
young man named Wei Jingsheng, a dissident jailed in the late 
1970s, asked a very simple question that I believe is troubling the 
Chinese leadership. Can China achieve the "four moderniza-
t ions" (agriculture, industry, science and technology, and na-
tional defense) without a fifth modernization? And what was the 
fifth? Democracy. 
It is very difficult to permit the kind of penetration that will 
accelerate China's economic transformation without, at the same 
time, producing unwanted cultural and political effects. For 
example, those people who return to China after prolonged study 
and residence abroad are going to be different than when they left. 
The last generation of Chinese modernizers which came to the 
West in the 1930s and 1940s has played a leading role in Chinese 
society and government ever since. In many respects, it has been 
they who have been the cosmopolitan element of Chinese society. 
Those who stay at home now, and more parochial leaders who 
have worked their way slowly up the apparatus, are the natural 
competitors of those who went abroad. 
Thinking About Managing The Relationship 
Thus far I have identified the problems that trouble our 
bilateral ties and I have suggested where the origins of some of 
those difficulties may lie. Where do we go from here? What are 
the essential elements of a China policy for the 1980s? 
Any policy must build from assumptions. Mine are: First, we 
have both congruences and divergences of interest with the PRC. 
One of the most intelligent formulations of this was the toast 
which Richard Nixon delivered in Beijing in February 1972. "We 
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have great differences today. What brings us together is that we 
have common interests which transcend those differences." Chi-
nese and American policies and interests differ (to various de-
grees) with respect to the Middle East, Korea, and arms control. 
Regarding other issues, such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, 
and Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the 
consensus between our two sides has been quite substantial. 
Second, American influence with respect to China is modest, but 
not entirely absent. It does matter what we do. What we do ought 
to be undertaken after having weighed Chinese sensitivities. With 
China, it matters not only what we do, but also how we do it. 
A third assumption I would start with is that we have an 
interest in the success of China's economic modernization strat-
egy, particularly as this development affects food and energy. 
One of the most destabilizing things that could happen is for 
China to become a huge net importer of food and energy, 
particularly in a context of global scarcity. Chinese energy and 
food self-sufficiency is in the interests of all other global consum-
ers. National policy has been, and should continue to be, to help 
promote economic development through technology transfer and 
human development programs. 
Within the context of these baseline assumptions, I see a 
sensible China policy for the 1980s consisting of the following 
elements: 1) A more liberal and effectively implemented technol-
ogy transfer policy. Indeed, the Reagan Administration, like its 
predecessor, has called for this, but it has not been effectively 
implemented by our bureaucracy. Secretary Shultz, during his 
February trip to the PRC, was specifically asked by American 
businessmen why the U.S. had been so slow in approving export 
licenses. My own view is that technology transfer ought not to 
include weapons sales, but the Administration's position has 
been that the U.S. government would be willing to consider 
weapons sales on a case-by-case basis. 2) An element of any 
sustainable policy is to seek balanced bilateral trade and to resist 
protectionist impulses. Presumably an expanding American and 
global economy would help avoid this danger. 3) We should quit 
talking about Taiwan for a while and sell no greater quantity or 
quality of weapons to the island than we had under the Carter 
Administration during the highest post-normalization year. We 
might consider measuring the value of these sales in current 
dollars. 4) We have to see China in the context of our relations 
with NATO, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Improved relations 
with the other major centers of power would make us a more 
attractive partner to Beijing. 5) Finally, we have to breathe new 
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life into the multitude of bilateral inter-agency agreements signed 
primarily under the Carter Administration. Agreements were 
concluded in such areas as health, education, environmental 
protection, and so on. Some of these earlier initiatives are 
languishing for lack of elite attention and financial resources. 
All five of these policy components are important in reversing 
the downward trend of U.S.-China relations over the past three 
years—the negative ratchet pattern, as I have called it—and 
putting the fundamentals of our relationship back in sound 
working order. 
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